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Abstract
Peer-prediction is a mechanism which elicits privately-held, non-variable information from
self-interested agents—formally, truth-telling is a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium of the mech-
anism. The original Peer-prediction mechanism suffers from two main limitations: (1) the
mechanism must know the “common prior” of agents’ signals; (2) additional undesirable and
non-truthful equilibria exist which often have a greater expected payoff than the truth-telling
equilibrium. A series of results has successfully weakened the known common prior assumption.
However, the equilibrium multiplicity issue remains a challenge.
In this paper, we address the above two problems. In the setting where a common prior
exists but is not known to the mechanism we show (1) a general negative result applying to a
large class of mechanisms showing truth-telling can never pay strictly more in expectation than
a particular set of equilibria where agents collude to “relabel” the signals and tell the truth
after relabeling signals; (2) provide a mechanism that has no information about the common
prior but where truth-telling pays as much in expectation as any relabeling equilibrium and
pays strictly more than any other symmetric equilibrium; (3) moreover in our mechanism, if
the number of agents is sufficiently large, truth-telling pays similarly to any equilibrium close
to a “relabeling” equilibrium and pays strictly more than any equilibrium that is not close to a
relabeling equilibrium.
1 Introduction
User feedback requests (e.g Ebay’s reputation system and the innumerable survey requests in one’s
email inbox) are increasingly prominent and important. However, the overwhelming number of
requests can lead to low participation rates, which in turn may yield unrepresentative samples. To
encourage participation, a system can reward people for answering requests. But this may cause
perverse incentives: some people may answer a large of number of questions simply for the reward
and without making any attempt to answer accurately. In this case, the reviews the system obtains
may be inaccurate and meaningless. Moreover, people may be motivated to lie when they face a
potential loss of privacy or can benefit in the future by lying now.
It is thus important to develop systems that motivate honesty. If we can verify the information
people provide in the future (e.g via prediction markets), we can motivate honesty via this future
verification. However, sometimes we need to elicit information without verification since the ob-
jective truth is hard to access or even does not exist (e.g. a self-report survey for involvement in
crime). In our paper, we focus on the situation where the objective truth is not observable.
One important framework for designing incentive systems without verification is peer predic-
tion [12]. Peer prediction uses each person’s information to predict other people’s information and
pays according to how good the prediction is. Peer prediction assumes people’s information is
related and the systems and the people share a common prior.
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Despite this clever insight, information elicitation mechanisms, such a peer prediction, are not
often used in practice. Two main obstacles that prevent peer prediction from being practical are
that (1) the mechanism must know the prior; (2) there are many other equilibria besides truth-
telling, which may pay as much or even more than the truth-telling equilibrium.
Recent research [6] indicates that individuals in lab experiments do not always truth-tell when
faced with peer prediction mechanisms; this may in part be related to the issue of equilibrium
multiplicity.
Our Contributions
1. We identify a particular set of equilibria, which we call permutation equilibria, which exist
in every (non-trivial) information elicitation mechanism; and show that for any (non-trivial)
information elicitation mechanism and for any permutation equilibrium, there exists a setting
where that permutation equilibrium is paid at least as much as truth-telling;
2. We propose an information elicitation mechanism that we call Disagreement Mechanism where
truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for any finite set of signals and any number of
agents greater than 3, and where:
a. Truth-telling is paid strictly more in expectation than any other symmetric equilibrium
that is not a permutation equilibrium, which have an expected payoff equal to the truth-
telling equilibrium;
b. Any symmetric equilibrium that has expected payoff close to truth-telling must be
“close” to a permutation equilibrium;
c. If the number of agents is sufficiently large then any asymmetric equilibrium which is
“close” to a permutation equilibrium has expected payoff “close” to that of the truth-
telling equilibrium, and any equilibrium that is not “close” to a permuation equilibrium
pays strictly less then the truth-telling equilibrium.
Permutation equilibria are intuitively unnatural and risky as they require extreme coordination
amongst the agents. Thus our results about symmetric equilibrium are quite strong, despite the
impossibility result. Asymmetric equilibrium require more coordination between agents than sym-
metric equilibrium. Additionally, the possible gains from doing so are limited and go to zero as the
number of agents increase. We believe the mechanism we propose can motivate a small number of
agents to tell the truth no matter how many signals they receive.
High Level Techniques Our Disagreement Mechanism pays agents individually (locally) for
“agreement” and globally for “disagreement”. When agents collude, they share information about
their strategies. Since they are paid individually for “agreement”, they will use their information
about other people’s strategies and “agree to agree” which reduces their global payoff which depends
on “disagreement”.
Essentially, when agents collude, our Disagreement Mechanism encourages each agent to im-
plicitly admit their collusion by unilaterally increasing their individual payoff for doing so, but
the mechanism then simultaneously decreases the total payoffs to all agents. Only when agents
do not choose to collude and lack information about other people’s strategies, can they “agree to
disagree.” In this case, even when they maximize their individual payoff, globally they still have a
lot of disagreement.
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Technical Contributions In addition to the above results, our works has several contributions
in the techniques employed:
1. Our Disagreement Mechanism encourages not only agents with the same private information
to agree, but also agents with different private information to disagree. We present a novel
way to measure the amount of “information” by casting the reports as multiple labelled points
in a space and measuring the quality of the “classification”.
2. To show that the “classification” quality always decreases with non-truthful equilibria, we
exploit tools from information theory, namely Information Monotonicity. Despite their nat-
ural and powerful application, to our knowledge, this is the first time such tools have been
explicitly employed in the peer prediction literature.
3. We provide a framework to analyse the structure of the equilibrium of a very complex game.
1.1 Related Work
There are several papers [14, 18, 15, 16, 22, 17, 5, 19, 20, 21] that focused on the goal of removing
the assumption that the mechanism knows the common prior and successfully weaken this known
common prior assumption after peer prediction [12] is introduced.
Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) [14] first successfully weakened the known common prior as-
sumption and provides an important framework for mechanisms without known common prior.
BTS requires the agents report—in addition to their reported signal—a forecast (prediction) of the
other agents’ reported signals, and uses this predictions in lieu of the common prior. BTS incentives
agents to report accurate forecasts by rewarding forecasts that have the ability to predict the other
agents’ reported signal.
However, BTS has two weakness: (1) BTS requires that the number of agents goes to infinity
(or is large enough in a modified version) since the mechanism needs agents to believe it has access
to the true distribution of from which agents’ signals are drawn. (2) The equilibrium analysis
provided in [14] is in the case where the number of agents goes to infinity and only proves that
truth-telling has expected payment at least as high as other equilibrium and so does not avoid the
case that truth-telling pays equivalently to many other equilibrium.
Several mechanisms [18, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21] are based on the BTS framework and address the
first weakness of BTS. Robust Bayesian Truth Serum (RBTS) [18] is a mechanism which can only
be applied to binary signals and the multi-valued RBTS [15] mechanism can be applied to non-
binary signals while it requires an additional assumption that every agent believes the probability
that other agents receive signal σ is higher if he himself also receives σ. Both of these works do
not solve the equilibrium multiplicity issue, but do work for a small number of agents. Minimal
Truth Serum (MTS) [17] is a mechanism where agents have the option to report or not report
their predictions, and also lacks analysis of non-truthful equilibria. MTS uses a typical zero-sum
technique such that all equilibria are paid equally. In contrast, we show that in our Disagreement
Mechanism any equilibrium that is even close to paying more than the truth-telling equilibrium
must be close to a small set of “permutation” equilibrium.
Thus, while the above work addresses the first weakness of BTS, it does not address the second
and also lacks an analysis of the non-truthful equilibrium. Jurca and Faltings [8, 9] have analysis
of non-truthful pure strategies. However, Jurca and Faltings [8, 9] assume the mechanism knows
the prior and leave the analysis of mixed strategies as an open question. Kong et al. [11] have
analysis of all equilibria including truthful and non-truthful, pure and mixed strategies while the
mechanism still needs to know the prior in [11]’s setting. Our work follows the framework of BTS
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and addresses the two weaknesses of BTS simultaneously when the mechanism does not know the
common prior.
Now we introduce several works that have different settings than our work. The mechanisms
in [4, 10] are under a different setting where agents have several a priori similar tasks. The mech-
anism in [4] rewards agents based on agreement which is similar to the Peer Prediction setting.
That mechanism also uses the presence of multiple tasks to elicit agent strategies with high effort,
and thus Dasgupta and Ghosh [4] address the equilibrium multiplicity issue for binary signals in
their setting. Our setting is different since the agents only have one task (and thus we do not have
to assume relations between tasks) and our results for equilibrium multiplicity issue are robust to
non-binary signals. Kamble et al. [10] consider both homogeneous and heterogeneous population
setting. However, this work requires large group of a priori similar tasks and their mechanisms
contain equilibria that are paid higher than truth-telling. Zhang and Chen [22] propose a mech-
anism Knowledge Free Peer Prediction (KFPP) that does not know the common prior and has
truth-telling as an equilibrium for small group of agents and non-binary signals. However, Knowl-
edge Free Peer Prediction (KFPP) is a sequential game so agents cannot naturally report signals
and predictions at the same time which is different than our setting (KFPP can be implemented
non-sequentially but this requires a very complicated and unrealistic prediction reports). Finally,
Cai et al. [3] have a different setting than our work while it also uses the Peer Prediction insight.
The mechanism in [3] collects a set of data (xi, yi) to approximate a function f where yi is a noisy
version of f(xi). That mechanism rewards worker i who provides data (xi, yi) by comparing yi and
fˆ−i(xi) where fˆ−i is an approximate function based on other workers’ data.
Independent Work As a building block to our final mechanism, we propose a mechanism that
we call the Truthful Mechanism which is the same as the “Divergence-Based Bayesian Truth Serum”
independently proposed in [16]. In this unknown common prior mechanism, agents can naturally
report their signal and prediction at the same time and truth-telling is a strict Bayesian Nash
equilibrium for a small group of agents and non-binary signals without additional assumptions.
However, Radanovic and Faltings [16] do not analyse non-truthful equilibria. In our paper, we
analyse the structure of the equilibrium (including non-truthful equilibria) in the Truthful Mecha-
nism and propose a modified mechanism that we call the Disagreement Mechanism which retains
the same set of equilibria as the Truthful Mechanism yet addresses the equilibrium multiplicity
issue.
2 Preliminaries, Background, and Notation
We will defer the proofs for most claims to Section 5.4.
2.1 Prior Definitions and Assumptions
We consider a setting with n agents and a set of signals Σ, and define a setting as a tuple (n,Σ).
Each agent i has a private signal σi ∈ Σ chosen from a joint distribution Q over Σn called the
prior. Given a prior Q, for σ ∈ Σ, let qi(σ) = PrQ[σi = σ] be the a priori probability that agent
i receives signal σ. Let qj,i(σ
′|σ) = PrQ[σj = σ′|σi = σ] be the probability that agent j receives
signal σ given that agent i received signal σ′.
We say that a prior Q over Σ is symmetric if for all σ, σ′ ∈ Σ and for all pairs of agents i 6= j
and i′ 6= j′ we have qi(σ) = qi′(σ) and qi,j(σ|σ′) = qi′,j′(σ|σ′). That is, the first two moments of the
prior do not depend on the agent identities.
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Assumption 2.1 (Symmetric Prior). We assume throughout that the agents’ signals σ are drawn
from some joint symmetric prior Q.
Because we will assume that the prior is symmetric, we denote qi(σ) by q(σ) and qi,j(σ|σ′)
(where i 6= j) by q(σ|σ′). We also define qσ = q(·|σ).
Assumption 2.2 (Non-zero Prior). We assume that for any σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, q(σ) > 0, q(σ|σ′) > 0.
Assumption 2.3 (Informative Prior). We assume if agents have different private signals, they
will have different expectations for the fraction of at least one signal. That is for any σ 6= σ′, there
exists σ′′ such that q(σ′′|σ) 6= q(σ′′|σ′).
The following assumption conceptually states that one state is not just a more likely version of
another state, and can be thought of as a weaker version of assuming q(σ|·) are linearly independent.
Assumption 2.4 (Fine-grained Prior). We assume that for any σ 6= σ′ ∈ Σ, there exists σ′′, σ′′′
such that
q(σ|σ′′)
q(σ′|σ′′) 6=
q(σ|σ′′′)
q(σ′|σ′′′)
If this assumption does not hold, then in some since σ and σ′ are the same signal. We can create
a new prior by replacing σ and σ′ with a new signal σ0 := σ or σ′, and not lose any information,
in the sense that we can still recover the original prior. To see this, we first define p = q(σ)q(σ′) , and
note that for all σ′′, p = q(σ|σ
′′)
q(σ′|σ′′) . Whenever σ0 is drawn in the new prior, we simply replace it by
σ with probability p and σ′ with probability 1 − p. This produces the same prior for agents that
have no information or other their signal’s information.
We illustrate this in the below example:
Example 2.5. Q =
 q(s1|s1) q(s1|s2) q(s1|s3)q(s2|s1) q(s2|s2) q(s2|s3)
q(s3|s1) q(s3|s2) q(s3|s3)
 =
 0.1 0.2 0.30.2 0.4 0.6
0.7 0.4 0.1
 is not a fine-grained
prior since
q(s1|s1)
q(s2|s1) =
q(s1|s2)
q(s2|s2) =
q(s1|s3)
q(s2|s3)
Note that in this example, even we combine s1 and s2 to be a single signal s0 which is defined
as s0 := s1 or s2, we do not lose any information: if an agent knows that the fraction of agents
who report s0 is x, we know his belief for the expectation of the fraction of s1 must be
x
3 no matter
what private signal he receives.
We only require the fine-grained prior assumption to show that truth-telling is strictly “better”
than any other symmetric equilibrium (excluding permutation equilibrium). In the above example
where the prior is not fine-grained, if agents always report s1 when they receive s1 or s2, this does
not lose information (is not “worse”) comparing with the case agents always tell the truth. So we
cannot say truth-telling is strictly “better” than any other equilibrium when the prior is not fine-
grained. However, this assumption is not necessary to show that truth-telling is a strict Bayesian
equilibrium of our mechanism, nor to show that the agent welfare of truth-telling is at least as high
as other symmetric equilibrium.
Assumption 2.6 (Ensemble Prior). Although we talk of a single prior, in fact we have an ensemble
Q = {Qn}n∈N,n≥3 of priors; one for each possible number of agents greater than 3. We assume
that all Qn are over the same signal set Σ have have identical q(σ) and q(σ
′|σ).
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When the number of agents n changes, the joint prior actually changes as well, but the first
two moments of the prior are fixed. This allows us to make meaningful statements about n going
to infinity.
We sometimes will denote the class of priors that satisfy all five of these assumptions as SNIFE
priors.
2.2 Game Setting and Equilibrium Concepts
Given a setting (n,Σ) with prior Q, we consider a game in which each agent i is asked to report his
private signal σi ∈ Σ and his prediction pi ∈ ∆Σ, a distribution over Σ, where pi = qσi . For any
σ ∈ Σ, pi(σ) is agent i’s (reported) expectation for the fraction of other agents who has received σ
given he has received σi. However, agents may not tell the truth. We denote Σ ×∆Σ by R. We
define a report profile of agent i as ri = (σˆi, pˆi) ∈ R where σˆi is agent i’s reported signal and pˆi is
agent i’s reported prediction.
We would like to encourage truth-telling, namely that agent i reports σˆi = σi, pˆi = qσi . To this
end, agent i will receive some payment νi(σˆi, pˆi, σˆ−i, pˆ−i) from our mechanism.
Now we consider the strategy an agent plays in the game.
Definition 2.7 (Strategy). Given a mechanismM, we define the strategy ofM for setting (n,Σ)
as a mapping s from (σ,Q) (the signal and common prior received) to a probability distribution
over R (the reported signal, prediction pair).
That is, for each possible signal σ and prior Q an receives, he will choose a signal, prediction
pair to report from some distribution s(σ,Q). We define a strategy profile s as a profile of all
agents’ strategies {s1, s2, ...sn} and we say agents play s if for any i, agent i plays strategy si. We
say a strategy profile is symmetric if each agent plays the same strategy.
We define the agent welfare of a strategy profile s and a mechanism M for setting (n,Σ)
with prior Q to be the expectation of the sum of payments to each agent and we write it as
AWM(n,Σ, Q, s).
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium consists of a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) such that no player
wihes to change her strategy, given the strategies of the other players and the information contained
in the prior and her signal. Formally,
Definition 2.8 (Bayesian Nash equilibrium). Given a family of priors Q, a strategy profile s =
(s1, . . . , sn) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if for any prior Q ∈ Q, for any i, and for
any s′i
E(σˆ′i,pˆ′i)←s′i(σi,Q),(σˆ−i,pˆ−i)←s−i(σ−i,Q)[νi(σˆ
′
i, pˆ
′
i, σˆ−i, pˆ−i)]
≤E(σˆi,pˆi)←si(σi,Q),(σˆ−i,pˆ−i)←s−i(σ−i,Q)[νi(σˆi, pˆi, σˆ−i, pˆ−i)]
In the case where, for some i, the equality holds if and only if s′i = si, we say this strategy
profile is a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium for prior family Q.
Remark 2.9 (Equilibrium for a Given Prior). Note that we assume agents have a common prior
Q, so often for convenience, we will implicitly assume Q is fixed, at which point a strategy is a
mapping from Σ to a probability distribution over R. We will call such a strategy profile s an
equilibrium for prior Q if it satisfies the condition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium when Q is fixed.
Assuming a fixed prior Q, for any strategy profile s = (s1, s2, ..., sn), we will represent the
marginal distribution of an agent i’s strategy for her signal report as a matrix θi where θi(σˆ, σ)
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is the probability that agent will report signal σˆ when his private signal is σ. Note that θi is a
transition matrix, that is the sum of every column is 1. We call θi the signal strategy of agent
i. We also call (θ1, θ2, ..., θn) the signal strategy of s. We define the average signal strategy of s
as θ¯n =
∑
i θi
n . The following claim relates this average signal strategy to the distribution of all
reported signals:
Claim 2.10. Assume that the distribution over all agents’ private signals is ω ∈ ∆Σ, the distribu-
tion over all agents’ reported signals will be θ¯nω.
Note that the mechanism actually collects agents’ reported signals, so in order to estimate the
distribution over their private signals, we hope θ¯n is (close to) the identity matrix I.
2.3 Special Strategy Profiles
In this section, we will introduce three special types of strategy profiles that we call truth-telling,
best prediction strategy profiles, and permutation strategy profiles.
Definition 2.11 (Truth-telling). We define a strategy profile as truth-telling if for all i, and for
all Q, s(σi, Q) = (σi,qσi) with probability 1. We write the truth-telling strategy profile as T.
For every agent i, let σˆ be a randomly chosen agent’s reported signal, when other agents tell the
truth, the distribution of σˆ is qσi . However, if agents play strategy s, for agent i, the distribution
of σˆ depends on not only his prior Q but also the strategy s. We define the distribution of σˆ for
agent i as qsσi .
Claim 2.12.
qsσi = θ−iqσi
where (θ1, θ2, ..., θn) is s’s signal strategy and θ−i =
∑
j 6=i θj
n−1 .
When agents play strategy s, to best predict other agents’ reported signal, agent i should be
report qsσi rather than qσi . This motivates our definition for best prediction strategy profile which
is a strategy profile where every agent i gives his “best prediction” qsσi .
Definition 2.13 (Best Prediction Strategy Profile). We say a strategy profile s is a best prediction
strategy profile if for every agent i, he reports qsσi . We call a best strategy prediction strategy
profile s a symmetric best strategy prediction strategy profile if θi = θ for every i.
Now we begin to introduce the definition of a permutation strategy profile. Intuitively, if agents
“collude” to relabel the signals and then tell the truth with relabeled signals, they actually play
what we will call permutation strategy profile.
Given a permutation pi : Σ 7→ Σ (which is actually a relabeling of signals), by abusing notation
a little bit, we define pi : Q 7→ Q as a mapping from a prior Q to a permuted prior pi(Q) where for
any σ1, σ2, ..., σn ∈ Σ,
Prpi(Q)(σ1, σ2, ..., σn) = PrQ(pi
−1(σ1), pi−1(σ2), ..., pi−1(σn))
where σi is the private signal of agent i. Notice that it follows that:
Prpi(Q)(pi(σ1), pi(σ2), ..., pi(σn)) = PrQ(σ1, σ2, ..., σn).
Intuitively, pi(Q) is the same with Q when the signals are relabeled according to pi.
For any strategy s, we define pi(s) as the strategy such that pi(s)(σ,Q) = s(pi(σ), pi(Q)).
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Definition 2.14 (Permuted Strategy Profile). For any strategy profile s, we define pi(s) as a
strategy profile with pi(s) = (pi(s1), pi(s2), ..., pi(sn)).
Note that pi−1piQ = Q which implies pi−1pi(s) = s.
Definition 2.15 (Permutation Strategy Profile). We define a strategy profile s as a permutation
strategy profile if there exists a permutation pi : Σ→ Σ such that s = pi(T).
Note that if agents play pi(T), then the signal strategy of each agent is pi, and so the distribution
of report profiles is θ¯nω = piω.
There exists a natural bijection between permutation strategy profiles and |Σ|×|Σ| permutation
matrices. If the permutation strategy profile is constructed by permutation pi, the only non-zero
entries of the corresponding permutation matrix θpi are θpi(pi(σ), σ) = 1 for all σ ∈ Σ. For a
transition matrix θ, if θ is not a permutation matrix, we would like to give a definition for when
a transition matrix θ is what we call τ -close to a permutation given any τ > 0. This definition is
motivated by the below claim and will be described after it.
Claim 2.16. For any transition matrix θm×m where the sum of every column is 1, θ is a permu-
tation matrix iff for any row of θ, there at most one non-zero entry.
Now we give a definition for τ -close.
Definition 2.17 (τ -close). We say a signal strategy θ is τ -close to a permutation if for any row of
θ, there is at most one entry that is greater than τ .
2.4 Mechanism Design Goals
We want to design “good” mechanisms that motivate the agents to reveal their private information
truthfully. Now we will give several definitions for “good” mechanisms:
We say that a mechanism is truthful if truth-telling is a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium
whenever Q is a symmetric and informative distribution.
We say that a mechanism has truth-telling as a focal equilibrium if, for any SNIFE prior Q, the
mechanism is truthful and the agent welfare is strictly higher in the truth-telling equilibrium than
in any other any other Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Recall that the agent welfare is the expected
sum of payments for all agents.
However, it turns out that making truth-telling focal is too much to ask. We will show that with
an unknown common prior, for any mechanism, and any permutation strategy profile, there exists
a prior such that that permutation strategy profile is an equilibrium and has agent welfare at least
as much as truth-telling. One natural question is whether there is any mechanism such that all
permutation strategy profiles have agent welfare equal to each other, but strictly higher than any
other Bayesian Nash equilibrium? This question motivates a weaker version of focal : quasi-focal.
Formally, we say that a mechanism has truth-telling as a quasi-focal equilibrium if, for any
SNIFE prior Q, the mechanism is truthful and agent-welfare is strictly higher in the permutation
equilibrium than in any other Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the agents do not play a permuta-
tion strategy profile.
It will turn out that the mechanism we purpose cannot make truth-telling quasi-focal. However,
we can show that it satisfies the following three slight relaxations of the definition:
Symmetric-quasi-focal : We say truth-telling is symmetric-quasi-focal in a mechanism if
1. all permutation equilibrium have equal agent welfare; and
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2. any symmetric equilibrium that is not a permutation equilibrium has agent-welfare
strictly less than truth-telling.
(τ1, γ1)-robust-symmetric-quasi-focal : We say truth-telling is (τ1, γ1)-robust-symmetric-quasi-
focal in a mechanism if any symmetric equilibrium that pays within γ1 of truth-telling must
be τ1(γ1) close to a permutation strategy profile.
(τ2, γ2)-robust-approximate-quasi-focal : We say truth-telling is (τ2, γ2)-robust-approximate-
quasi-focal in a mechanism if
1. all permutation equilibrium pay the same;
2. no equilibrium has agent welfare greater than γ2(n) more than that of truth-telling where
n is the number of agents; and
3. any profile that pays within γ2(n) of truth-telling must be τ2(n) close to a permutation
strategy profile.
2.5 F-divergence
Now we introduce f -divergence, a key tool we will use in our mechanism design. f -divergence([2]) is
used to measuring the “difference” between distributions. One important property of f -divergence
is information monotonicity: For any two distributions, if we post-process each distribution in the
same way, the two distributions will become “closer” because of the information loses.
F -divergence [1] Df : ∆Σ × ∆Σ → R is a non-symmetric measure of difference between a
distribution p ∈ ∆Σ and a distribution q ∈ ∆Σ and is defined to be
Df (p,q) =
∑
σ∈Σ
p(σ)f
(
p(σ)
q(σ)
)
where f(·) is a convex function. Now we introduce the properties of f -divergence:
1. Non-negative: For any p,q, Df (p,q) ≥ 0 and Df (p,q) = 0 if and only if p = q.
2. Convexity: Both Df (·,q) and Df (p, ·) are convex functions for any p,q.
3. Information Monotonicity: For any p,q, and transition matrix θ ∈ R|Σ|×|Σ| where θ(σ, σ′)
is the probability that we map σ′ to σ, we have Df (p,q) ≥ Df (θp, θq). When θ is a
permutation, Df (p,q) = Df (θp, θq).
Now we introduce the proof in ([1]) for information monotonicity and give the conditions for
the inequality of information monotonicity to be strict.
Lemma 2.18 (Information Monotonicity ([1])). For any strictly convex function f , f -divergence
Df (p,q) satisfies information monotonicity so that for any transition matrix θ ∈ RΣ×Σ, Df (p,q) ≥
Df (θp, θq).
Moreover, the inequality is strict if and only if there exists σ, σ′, σ′′ such that θ(σ, σ′)p(σ′) > 0,
θ(σ, σ′′)p(σ′′) > 0 and p(σ
′′)
p(σ′) 6= q(σ
′′)
q(σ′) .
We give an example where the strictness condition is not satisfied in appendix.
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Proof. The proof follows from algebraic manipulation and one application of convexity.
Df (θp, θq) =
∑
σ
(θp)(σ)f
(
(θq)(σ)
(θp)(σ)
)
(1)
=
∑
σ
θ(σ, ·)pf
(
θ(σ, ·)q
θ(σ, ·)p
)
(2)
=
∑
σ
θ(σ, ·)pf
(
1
θ(σ, ·)p
∑
σ′
θ(σ, σ′)p(σ′)
q(σ′)
p(σ′)
)
(3)
≤
∑
σ
θ(σ, ·)p 1
θ(σ, ·)p
∑
σ′
θ(σ, σ′)p(σ′)f
(
q(σ′)
p(σ′)
)
(4)
=
∑
σ
p(σ)f
(
q(σ)
p(σ)
)
= Df (p,q) (5)
The second equality holds since (θp)(σ) is dot product of the σth row of θ and p.
The third equality holds since
∑
σ′ θ(σ, σ
′)p(σ′)q(σ
′)
p(σ′) = θ(σ, ·)q.
The fourth inequality follows from the convexity of f(·).
The last equality holds since
∑
σ θ(σ, σ
′) = 1.
We now examine under what conditions the inequality in Equation 4 is strict. Note that for
any strictly convex function g, if ∀u, λu > 0, g(
∑
u λuxu) =
∑
u λug(xu) if and only if there exists
x such that ∀u, xu = x. By this property, the inequality is strict if and only if there exists σ, σ′, σ′′
such that p(σ
′′)
p(σ′) 6= q(σ
′′)
q(σ′) and θ(σ, σ
′)p(σ′) > 0, θ(σ, σ′′)p(σ′′) > 0.
Corollary 2.19. Given SNIFE prior Q, for any θ that is not a permutation, there exists two
private signals σ1 6= σ2 such that Df (θqσ1 , θqσ2) < Df (qσ1 ,qσ2)
Proof. First notice that when θ is not a permutation, based on Claim 2.16, there exists a row of
θ such that the row has at least two positive entries, in other words, there exists σ, σ′, σ′′ such
that θ(σ, σ′), θ(σ, σ′′) > 0. Based on the non-zero and fine-grained assumptions of Q, there exists
σ1 6= σ2 such that
θ(σ, σ′)p(σ′), θ(σ, σ′′)p(σ′′) > 0 and p(σ
′)
p(σ′′) 6= q(σ
′)
q(σ′′) where p = qσ1 ,q = qσ2 . When
θ(σ, σ′)p(σ′), θ(σ, σ′′)p(σ′′) > 0, we have θ(σ, ·)p > 0. By Lemma 2.18, we have Df (θqσ1 , θqσ2) <
Df (qσ1 ,qσ2)
Now we will introduce a special f -divergence called Hellinger-divergence and then we will give
several properties of Hellinger-divergence ([1]).
Hellinger-divergence If we pick the convex function f(·) to be (√x − 1)2, we will obtain
Hellinger-divergerce
D∗(p,q) =
∑
σ
(
√
p(σ)−
√
q(σ))2
Since Hellinger-divergence is an f -divergence, it also has convexity and information monotonicity.
Besides these two properties, Hellinger-divergence has another two properties which will be used
in the future.
1. Bounded divergence: 0 ≤ D∗(p,q) ≤ 1
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2. Square root triangle inequality:
√
D∗(·, ·) is a metric.
Note that Hellinger-divergence is bounded which is different than KL-divergence. Since we use
Hellinger-divergence in our disagreement mechanism, we can always guarantee bounded payment.
2.6 Proper Scoring Rules
Now we introduce strictly proper scoring rules, another key tool we will use in our mechanism
design. Starting with [12], proper scoring rules have become a common ingredient in mechanisms
for elicit unverifiable information elicitation (e.g. [14, 18]).
A scoring rule PS : Σ×∆Σ → R takes in a signal σ ∈ Σ and a distribution over signals δΣ ∈ ∆Σ
and outputs a real number. A scoring rule is proper if, whenever the first input is drawn from a
distribution δΣ, then the expectation of PS is maximized by δΣ. A scoring rule is called strictly
proper if this maximum is unique. We will assume throughout that the scoring rules we use are
strictly proper. By slightly abusing notation, we can extend a scoring rule to be PS : ∆Σ×∆Σ → R
by simply taking PS(δΣ, δ
′
Σ) = Eσ←δΣ(σ, δ′Σ). We note that this means that any proper scoring
rule is linear in the first term.
Example 2.20 (Example of Proper Scoring Rule). Fix an outcome space Σ for a signal σ. Let
q ∈ ∆Σ be a reported distribution. The Logarithmic Scoring Rule maps a signal and reported
distribution to a payoff as follows:
L(σ,q) = log(q(σ)).
Let the signal σ be drawn from some random process with distribution p ∈ ∆Σ.
Then the expected payoff of the Logarithmic Scoring Rule
Eσ←p[L(σ,q)] =
∑
σ
q(σ) log q(σ) = L(p,q)
According to [7], this value will be maximized if and only if q = p.
3 Impossibility of Truth-telling Being Focal
In this section, we show the impossibility of truth-telling being focal. In fact, we show something
stronger, that no strategy profile can always be the equilibrium and have agent welfare that is
strictly greater than any other equilibrium (including truth-telling). Moreover, our impossibility
result applies to a very general setting of mechanisms. The case that we consider, where each agent
reports a signal and prediction pair, is a special case of this general setting.
We first define the class of mechanisms to which our impossibility result will apply.
Definition 3.1 (Mechanism). We define a mechanism M for a setting (n,Σ) as a tuple M :=
(R,M) where R is a set of all possible report profiles the mechanism allows, and M : Rn 7→ Rn is
a mapping from all agents’ report profiles to each agent’s reward.
The intuitive explanation for this impossibility result is that the agents can collude to relabel
the signals and the mechanism has no way to defend against this relabeling without knowing some
information about agents’ common prior.
The proposition stated below implies that, in particular, no strategy profile can always be an
equilibrium that has the agent welfare that is strictly greater than any other equilibrium.
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Proposition 3.2. Let M be a mechanism that does not know the common prior, for any strategy
profile s, and any permutation pi:
(1) s is a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium of M for any symmetric, informative prior iff pi(s) is
a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium of M for any symmetric, informative prior.
(2) There exists a prior Q such that AWM(n,Σ, Q, s) ≤ AWM(n,Σ, Q, pi(s)).
The key idea to prove this theorem is what we refer to as Indistinguishable Scenarios:
Definition 3.3 (Scenario). We define a scenario for the setting (n,Σ) as a tuple (Q, s) where Q is
a prior, and s is a strategy profile.
Given mechanism M, for any scenario A = (QA, sA), we write AWM(n,Σ, A) as the agent
welfare when agents play sA and have common prior QA.
For two scenarios A = (QA, sA), B = (QB, sB) for setting (n,Σ), let σA := (σ1A , σ2A , ..., σnA) be
agents’ private signals drawn from QA, σB := (σ1B , σ2B , ..., σnB ) be agents’ private signals drawn
from QB.
Definition 3.4 (Indistinguishable Scenarios). We say two scenarios A,B are indistinguishable A ≈
B if there is a coupling of the random variables σA and σB such that ∀i, sA(σiA , QA) = sB(σiB , QB)
and agent iA has the same belief about the world as agent iB, in other words, Pr(σˆ|σiA , QA, sA) =
Pr(σˆ|σiB , QB, sB) ∀σˆ ∈ Σ.
Now we will prove two properties of indistinguishable scenarios which are the main tools in the
proof for our impossibility result.
Observation 3.5. If (QA, sA) ≈ (QB, sB), then (i) for any mechanism M, sA is a (strict) equilib-
rium for prior QA iff sB is a (strict) equilibrium for prior QB. (ii) AWM(n,Σ, A) = AWM(n,Σ, B)
At a high level, (1) is true since any reported profile distribution that agent iA can deviate to,
agent iB can deviate to the same reported profile distribution as well and obtain the same expected
payment as agent iA.
Formally, we will prove the⇒ direction in (1) by contradiction. The proof of the other direction
will be similar. Consider the coupling for σA, σB mentioned in the definition of indistinguishable
scenarios. For the sake of contradiction, assume there exists i and σiB such that σˆ
′ 6= siB (σiB , QB)
is a best response for agent iB. Since agent iA has the same belief about the world as agent iB and
siA(σiA , QA) = siB (σiB , QB), σˆ
′ 6= siA(σiA , QA) is a best response to agent iA as well, which is a
contradiction to the fact that sA is a strictly equilibrium for prior QA.
To gain intuition about (2), consider the coupling again. For any i, agent iA reports the same
thing and has the same belief for the world as agent iB, which implies the expected payoff of agent
iA is the same as agent iB. (2) follows.
Now we are ready to prove our impossibility result:
of Proposition 3.2. We prove part (1) and part (2) separately.
Proof of Part (1) Let A := (Q, s), B := (pi−1(Q), pi(s)). We will show that for any strategy
profile s and any prior Q, A ≈ B. Based on our above observations, part (1) immediately follows
from that fact.
To prove (Q, s) ≈ (pi−1Q, pi(s)), we can couple (σ1, σ2, ..., σn) with (pi−1(σ1), pi−1(σ2), .., pi−1(σn))
where (σ1, σ2, ..., σn) is drawn from Q. It is a legal coupling since
Prpi−1(Q)(pi
−1(σ1), pi−1(σ2), .., pi−1(σn)) = PrQ(σ1, σ2, ..., σn)
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according to the definition of pi−1(Q).
Now we show this coupling satisfies the condition in Definition 3.4. First note that
pi(si)(pi
−1(σi), pi−1(Q)) = si(σi, Q). Now we begin to calculate Pr(σˆ|σiB , QB, sB)
Pr(σˆ|σiB , QB, sB) =Pr(σˆ|pi−1σi, pi−1(Q), pi(s)) (6)
=
∑
j
Pr(j)
∑
σ′
Prpi−1(Q)(σ
′|pi−1σi)Pr(pi(sj)(σ′, pi−1(Q)) = σˆ) (7)
=
∑
j
Pr(j)
∑
σ′
Prpi−1(Q)(σ
′|pi−1σi)Pr(sj(pi(σ′), pipi−1(Q)) = σˆ) (8)
=
∑
j
Pr(j)
∑
σ′
PrQ(pi(σ
′)|σi)Pr(sj(pi(σ′), Q) = σˆ) (9)
=
∑
j
Pr(j)
∑
σ′′
PrQ(σ
′′|σi)Pr(sj(σ′′, Q) = σˆ) (10)
=Pr(σˆ|σi, Q, s) = Pr(σˆ|σiA , QA, sA) (11)
From (6) to (7): To calculate a randomly chosen agent’s reported signal, we should sum over all
possible agents j and calculate the probability conditioning on agent j being picked. To calculate
the probability that agent j has reported σˆ, we should sum over all possible private signals agent
j has received and calculate the probability agent j reported σˆ conditioning on he received private
signal σ′, which is determined by agent j’s strategy.
By abusing notation a little bit, we can write pi(sj)(σ
′, pi−1Q) as a random variable (it is
actually a distribution) with Pr(pi(sj)(σ
′, pi−1Q) = σˆ) = pi(sj)(σ′, pi−1Q)(σˆ). According to above
explanation, (7) follows.
(8) follows from the definition of permuted strategy (See Section 2.3).
(9) follows from the definition of permuted prior (See Section 2.3).
By replacing pi(σ′) by σ′′, (10) follows.
We finished the proof A ≈ B, as previously argued, result (1) follows.
Proof for Part (2) We will prove the second part by contradiction:
Fix permutation strategy profile pi. First notice that there exists an positive integer Od such
that piOd = I where I is the identity and agents play I means they tell the truth (we can pick Od
as the order of pi in the permutation group).
Given any strategy profile s, for the sake of contradiction, we assume that there exists a mech-
anism M with unknown common prior such that AMM(n,Σ, Q, s) > AMM(n,Σ, Q, pi(s)) for any
prior Q. For positive integer k ∈ {0, 1, ..., Od}, we construct three scenarios:
Ak := (pi
k(Q), s), Ak+1 := (pi
k+1(Q), s), Bk := (pi
k(Q), pi(s))
and show for any k,
(I)AMM(n,Σ, Ak) > AMM(n,Σ, Bk),
(II) AMM(n,Σ, Ak+1) = AMM(n,Σ, Bk).
Combining (I), (II) and the fact A0 = AOd , we have
AMM(n,Σ, A0) > AMM(n,Σ, A1) > ...AMM(n,Σ, AOd) = AMM(n,Σ, A0)
which is a contradiction.
13
Now it is only left to show (I) and (II). Based on our assumption
AMM(n,Σ, Q, s) > AMM(n,Σ, Q, pi(s))
for any prior Q, we have (I). By the same proof we have in part (1), we have Ak+1 ≈ Bk, which
implies (II) according to our above observations.
Corollary 3.6. Let M be a mechanism that does not know the common prior, given truth-telling
strategy T, if there exists a permutation pi such that pi(T) 6= T, T cannot have agent welfare that
is always strictly highest among all equilibria.
The requirement that pi(T) 6= T ensures, that a truthful input to the mechanism depends on
the private signal of an agent. An example when this would not hold would be if there is only
possible input.
Proof. According to Proposition 3.2, pi(T) is an equilibrium as well and there exists a prior Q such
that the agent welfare of pi(T) is greater or equal to T, so T cannot have agent welfare that is
always strictly highest among all equilibria.
4 The Disagreement Mechanism
In this section, we will introduce two mechanisms: the Truthful Mechanism and the Disagreement
Mechanism. Both of these mechanisms are based on the Bayesian Truth serum (BTS) framework,
which means agents are paid based on a “prediction score” and an “information score”. We will
introduce the “prediction score” used in the two mechanisms first, it will become a strong tool to
motivate people to tell the truth.
Prediction Score via Proper Scoring Rules Agents will receive a prediction score based
on how well their prediction predicts a randomly chosen agent’s reported signal. Say an agent i
reports prediction pˆi then a random agent, call him agent j, is picked for him, agent i will receive a
prediction score PS(σˆj , pˆi) when PS is a proper scoring rule (see Section 2.5) of proper scoring rules
family. Note that any proper scoring rule works. PS(σˆj , pˆi) is maximized if and only if agent i’s
reported prediction pˆi is his expected likelihood for σˆj . Agent i cannot pretend to have a different
expected likelihood without reducing his expectation for his prediction score. Note that actually
when agents play a best prediction strategy profile (See definition 2.13), each agent maximizes his
individual prediction score given the signal strategy (θ1, θ2, ..., θn).
We cannot only pay agents based on prediction score, that will give no incentive to agents to
report their private signals. Similar with BTS, we need “information score” which is motivated by
a concept we call Inconsistency :
4.1 Inconsistency: Agree to Disagree
The common prior assumption tells us agents cannot agree to disagree. That is, if two agents
receive the same private information, they must have the same “belief” about the world. In our
setting, if agents tell the truth (or use a permutation strategy profile), whenever two agents report
the same signal, they will report the same prediction as well. We use the concept of inconsistency
to represent how much agents agree to disagree which we would like to discourage. We define
Inconsistency as the “difference” between two random agents’ predictions when they report the
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same signal. Permutation strategy profiles will have the lowest inconsistency score 0. We will give
a more formal definition later.
The Inconsistency concept motivates the Truthful Mechanism. We use a strictly proper scoring
rule PS(·, ·) to define the “difference” between two agents’ predictions in the Truthful Mechanism
and give each agent i an Information Score by randomly picking an agent j and punishing agent
i the “difference” between agent i’s and agent j’s predictions if they report the same signal.
Truthful Mechanism M: Let α, β > 0 be parameters and let PS be a strictly proper scoring
rule, then we define the truthful mechanism M(α, β, PS)1 as follows:
1. Each agent i reports a signal and a prediction ri = (σˆi, pˆi)
2. For each agent i and agent j, we define a prediction score that depends on agent i’s prediction
and agent j’s report signal
scoreP (ri, rj) = PS(σˆj , pˆi),
and an information score
scoreI(ri, rj) =
{
0 σˆi 6= σˆj
−(PS(pˆj , pˆj)− PS(pˆj , pˆi)) σˆi = σˆj
3. Each agent i is matched with a random agent j. The payment for agent i is
paymentM(α,β,PS)(i, r) = αscoreP (ri, rj) + βscoreI(ri, rj).
Theorem 4.1. 2
For any α, β > 0 and any strictly proper scoring rule PS, M(α, β, PS) has truth-telling as a
strict Bayesian-Nash equilibrium whenever the prior Q is informative and symmetric.
Proof. We must show that for every agent, if other agents tell the truth, then this agent can
(strictly) maximize his expected payoff if and only if he chooses to tell the truth.
Assume that all agents other than i are telling the truth. The probability that agent i is matched
1This mechanism is essentially the same as the Divergence-Based Bayesian Truth Serum mechanism previously
published in [16].
2An equivalent theorem was proved in Radanovic and Faltings [16], and we include it here for completeness.
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with agent j is Pr(j) = 1n−1 . The expected payoff for agent i is:
E[paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(i, r)|σi] (12)
=
∑
j 6=i
(Pr(j)E[αscoreP (ri, rj) + βscoreI(ri, rj)|σi]) (13)
=
∑
j 6=i
1
n− 1[αPS(E(σˆj |σi), pˆi) + β(−Pr(σˆj = σˆi|σi)E[(PS(pˆj , pˆj)− PS(pˆj , pˆi))|σi, σˆj = σˆi]]
(14)
=
∑
j 6=i
1
n− 1[αPS(E(σj |σi), pˆi) + β(Pr(σj = σˆi|σi)(PS(qσˆi , pˆi)− PS(qσˆi ,qσˆi)))] (15)
= αPS(E(
∑
j 6=i
1
n− 1σj |σi), pˆi) +
∑
j 6=i
β
n− 1[(Pr(σj = σˆi|σi)(PS(qσˆi , pˆi)− PS(qσˆi ,qσˆi)))] (16)
= αPS(θ−iqσi , pˆi) +
∑
j 6=i
β
n− 1[(Pr(σj = σˆi|σi)(PS(qσˆi , pˆi)− PS(qσˆi ,qσˆi)))] (17)
= αPS(qσi , pˆi) +
∑
j 6=i
β
n− 1[(Pr(σj = σˆi|σi)(PS(qσˆi , pˆi)− PS(qσˆi ,qσˆi)))] (18)
From (13) to (14): When σˆi 6= σˆj , the information score is 0, so we only need to consider the
case σˆi = σˆj .
From (14) to (15): All agents other than i tell the truth, so σˆj = σj and
pˆj = qσj = qσˆj = qσˆi .
From (15) to (16): The proper scoring rule is linear for the first entry.
From (16) to (17): Based on Claim 2.12, E(
∑
j 6=i
1
n−1σj |σi) = θ−iqσi .
From (17) to (18): Note that for any j 6= i, agent j tells the truth so θ−i = I.
First, if agent i plays truthfully, then σˆi = σi, pˆi = qσi , and we will have E(payment(i,M)|σi) =
αPS(qσi ,qσi) because PS(qσˆi , pˆi)− PS(qσˆi ,qσˆi) = 0.
Now show that to receive a payment this high, agent i must play truthfully. Assume that
E(payment(i,M)|σi) ≥ αPS(qσi ,qσi). First, the second term of Equation (18) is non-positive
based on the property of proper scoring rule. Then we must have that PS(qσi , pˆi) ≥ PS(qσi ,qσi),
but because PS is a strictly proper scoring rule, this happens only if pˆi = qσi . But this implies
that the second term of Equations (18) equals 0, and this requires that PS(qσˆi , pˆi) = PS(qσˆi ,qσˆi).
However, by the properties of strictly proper scoring rules, this means qσˆi = pˆi. However, we
already showed that pˆi = pi = qσi . Putting this together we see that qσˆi = qσi . Based on the
informative prior assumption, this implies that σˆi = σi.
So we proved that for any agent i, when other agents tell the truth, agent i can obtain the best
expected payoff if and only if he tells the truth which means truth-telling is a strict Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium in the truthful mechanism.
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4.2 Diversity from Disagreement
The previous section shows that we can encourage truth-telling (or permutation strategy profiles) by
punishing Inconsistency. The problem is that there may be many other equilibria with inconsistency
score 0. We consider an extreme example: All agents coordinate together and report the same signal
σ. For every agent, he will predict the fraction of σ is 100% to maximize his prediction score. While
such a strategy profile is consistent, the unitary predictions implies their report profiles have little
information. Motivated by this extreme example, we define a concept called Diversity.
Recall that Inconsistency is the expected “difference” (we will describe this “difference” later)
between two random agents’ predictions when they report the same signal, we define Diversity
as the expected Hellinger-divergence between two random agents’ predictions when they report
different signals. One of the reasons we use Hellinger-divergence is that it is f -divergence and we
can use information monotonicity here. To give a flavor of our future proof, we will give a simple
observation here which motivates our Disagreement Mechanism.
Observation 4.2. If the number of agents is infinite and agents play a best prediction strategy, for
every two agents i, j, their predictions becomes “closer” compared with agents play a permutation
strategy profile.
Proof. Based on Claim 2.12, agent i will report θ−iqσi given σi is his private signal and recall that
θ−i =
∑
j 6=i θi
n−1 where (θ1, θ2, ...., θn) is the signal strategy. Since limn→∞ θ−i = limn→∞ θ−j , we can
use θ to represent the common limit.
Via information monotonicity we have Df (θqσi , θqσj ) ≤ Df (qσi ,qσj ) which implies their
reported predictions becomes “closer”.
Note that if the number of agents is not infinite, we can still have the same result if agents play
a symmetric best prediction strategy profile since we only need θ−i = θ−j .
Ideally, we would like to show every equilibrium is a best prediction strategy profile, since it
will imply any permutation strategy profile is more diverse than any other equilibrium. However,
we believe it is not the case, instead, we introduce a new concept Classification that combines
Diversity and Inconsistency and show that the permutation strategy profiles almost have the highest
classification scores.
4.3 Classification: Diversity − Inconsistency
The set of all agents’ report profiles is a classification. In general, a classification is a map C : U → Σ
where U are multiple points and Σ is a set of labels. All points that are mapped to one label σ
construct a cluster Cσ. In our setting, the agents who report the same signal construct a cluster
which is a collection of their reported profiles.
If all agents tell the truth, then the predictions that are labeled with the same label are in
the same position in ∆Σ (common prior assumption) while the predictions that are labeled with
different labels are in different positions (because of our informative prior assumption). Intuitively,
it is an ideal classification since typically we hope in a good classification, the points with the same
label (in the same cluster) are close while the points with different labels are far from each other.
In general, a typical way to measure a classification C is
Q(C) =
∑
u,v∈U,C(u)6=C(v)
D1(u, v)−
∑
u,v∈U,C(u)=C(v)
D2(u, v)
where D1 and D2 are functions that measure the “difference” between points u, v ∈ U .
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Note that for Q(Cr),
∑
u,v∈U,Cr(u)6=Cr(v)D1(u, v) intuitively captures the concept of Diversity
while
∑
u,v∈U,Cr(u) 6=Cr(v)D2(u, v) intuitively captures Inconsistency. So Q(Cr) captures the concept
of Diversity− Inconsistency.
We will also show that if we use Diversity−Inconsistency as a new score, permutation strategies
will have strictly higher score than any other symmetric equilibrium and if the number of agents
are sufficient large, the equilibria with a higher score or even a score “close” to truth-telling must
be “close” to a permutation strategy profile. We will use this property to design a mechanism
that has truth-telling as both a robust-symmetric-quasi-focal and robust-approximate-quasi-focal
equilibrium. We will design a mechanism that satisfies the below two conditions which implies
that this mechanism has truth-telling as a weakly-quasi-focal equilibrium, and (1) has the same
equilibria with our previous Truthful Mechanism; and (2) in which the average agent-welfare is
Diversity− Inconsistency.
We will see that the below Disagreement Mechanism we propose satisfies the above two condi-
tions. To design this mechanism, we (a) first use a typical trick to create a zero-sum game which
has the same equilibria with the previous Truthful Mechanism; (b) pay each agent an extra score
that only depends on other agents which will not change the structure of the equilibria. We want
this extra score to represent Diversity− Inconsistency.
Disagreement Mechanism M+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) r = {r1, r2, ..., rn} is all agents’ report profiles
where for any r, ri = (σˆi, pˆi).
1. Zero-sum Trick : Divide the agents into two non-empty groups-group A and group B. Each
group of agents plays the game (mechanism) M that is restricted in their own group. For
group A, each agent iA receives a
scoreM(iA, r) =paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(iA, rA)
− 1|A|
∑
jB∈B
paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(jB, rB)
Where paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(iA, rA) is agent iA’s payment when he is paid by mechanism
M(α, β, PS(·, ·)) given group A’s report profiles rA and he can only be paired with a random
peer from group A (we have similar explanation for paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(jB, rB)). For agents
in group B, we use the analogous way to score them.
2. Additional Classification Reward : Each agent i is matched with two random agents j, k chosen
from all agents (including group A and group B), the payment for agent i is
paymentM+(α,β,PS(·,·)(i, r) = scoreM(i, r) + scoreC(rj , rk)
where
scoreC(rj , rk) =
 D
∗(pˆj , pˆk) σˆj 6= σˆk
−
√
D∗(pˆj , pˆk) σˆj = σˆk
recall that D∗ denotes the Hellinger Divergence.
Note that our Disagreement Mechanism cannot make truth-telling quasi-focal since if there are
m (the number of signals) agents and for any i, agent i always reports the ith signal and predicts
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that the jth signal occurs with probability 1m−1 if j 6= i while ith signal occurs with probability 0.
In this situation, each agent plays his best response and Inconsistency = 0, yet Diversity is much
higher than it is in the truth-telling equilibrium. Instead, we are going to prove our Disagreement
Mechanism makes truth-telling both a robustly-symmetric-quasi-focal and robustly-approximately-
quasi-focal equilibrium.
Theorem 4.3 (Main Theorem). Given any SNIFE prior, if the number of agents n ≥ 3, and if
α
β <
1
4m where m is the number of signals and n is the number of agents, then
1. M+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) is truthful;
2. M+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) has truth-telling as a symmetric-quasi-focal equilibrium;
3. M+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) has truth-telling as a (τ1, γ1)-robust-symmetric-quasi-focal equilibrium;
and
4. M+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) has truth-telling as a (τ2, γ2)-robust-approximate-quasi-focal equilibrium
where τ1(γ1) = O( 3
√
γ1), γ2(n) = O(
m√
n
) and τ2(n) = O(
6
√
m2
n ) (the constants we omit only
depend on the first two moments of prior Q)3.
Theorem 4.3 Part 1: M+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) is truthful.
Claim 4.4. The Disagreement Mechanism has the same equilibria as the Truthful Mechanism.
Note that we have already showM(α, β, PS(·, ·)) has truth-telling as a strict equilibrium for any
SNIFE prior in Theorem 4.1. Since M+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) does not change the equilibrium structure
ofM(α, β, PS(·, ·)) according to Claim 4.4, we haveM+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) has truth-telling as a strict
equilibrium for any SNIFE prior as well.
We will prove the rest of the theorem in the next section.
5 Showing Properties of Equilibrium
In this section, we are going to show Theorem 4.3 part 2, 3, 4.
We first give technical definitions for Diversity and Inconsistency and then prove that the
average agent-welfare in the Disagreement Mechanism is Diversity− Inconsistency.
We first introduce a short hand which will simplify the formula for Diversity and Inconsistency.∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ) ,
∫
σˆj ,pˆj ,σˆk,pˆk
Pr(σˆj ,pˆj)←sj(σj)(σˆj , pˆj)Pr(σˆk,pˆk)←sk(σk)(σˆk, pˆk)
where sj is the strategy of agent j and sj(σj) is a distribution over agent j’s report profile (σˆj , pˆj)
given agent j receives private signal σj and uses strategy sj , and similarly for agent k. This defines
the natural measure on the reports of agents j and k given that they play strategies sj and sk and
a fixed prior Q (which is implicit), and allows us to succinctly describe probabilities of events in
this space.
3Actually τ1(γ1) =
1
c1
3
√
γ1
c2,c3,c4
, γ2(n) =
4
√
2m√
n
and τ62 (n) =
128∗m2
nc61(c2c3c4)
2 , c1 = mins,t∈Σ q(s|t), c2 =
mins,t∈Σ Pr(s, t), c3 = minu,vmaxs,t || q(u|s)q(u|t) − q(v|s)q(v|t) ||2, c4 = mins,t,u f ′′( q(u|s)q(u|t) ) where f(x) = (
√
x− 1)2.
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Recall that Diversity is the expected Hellinger divergence D∗ between two random agents when
they report different signals, so
Diversity =
∑
j
k 6=j
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)δ(σˆj 6= σˆk)D∗(pˆj , pˆk)
where Pr(j, k) is the probability agents j, k are picked, and Pr(σj , σk) is the probability that
agent j receives private signal σj and agent k receives private signal σk.
Similarly, we can write down the technical definition for Inconsistency. But here we do not
use Hellinger divergence as the “difference” function in
∑
u,v∈U,Cr(u)=Cr(v)D(u, v), we use square
root of the Hellinger divergence which is the Hellinger distance as the “difference” function. The
reason is we want to use the convexity of the Hellinger divergence and the triangle inequality of the
Hellinger distance. We will describe the details in the future. For now we give a technical definition
for Inconsistency :
Inconsistency = −
∑
j
k 6=j
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)δ(σˆj = σˆk)
√
D∗(pˆj , pˆk)
Now we define the ClassificationScore as the expected average extra score scoreC :
ClassificationScore =
∑
i
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i,j
σi,σj ,σk
Pr(i)Pr(σi)Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk|σi)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)scoreC(rj , rk)
Claim 5.1. ClassificationScore = Diversity− Inconsistency
Claim 5.2. Any permutation strategy profile has the same ClassificationScore, Diversity, and In-
consistency as truth-telling.
Claim 5.3. The average agent-welfare in our Disagreement Mechanism is the ClassificationScore
5.1 Proof Outline for Main Theorem
First note that the average agent-welfare is the ClassificationScore. We want to show that
1. If the number of agents is greater than 3, then any symmetric equilibrium that is not per-
mutation equilibrium must have ClassificationScore strictly less than truth-telling; and any
symmetric equilibrium that has ClassificationScore close to truth-telling must be close to a
permutation equilibrium.
2. If the number of agents is sufficient large, then no equilibrium can have a ClassificationScore
that is much greater than truth-telling; any equilibrium that has ClassificationScore close to
truth-telling must be close to a permutation equilibrium.
To prove our main theorem, we first introduce the concept of TotalDivergence and then we use
this value as a bridge. Recall that we defined
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Diversity =
∑
j,k 6=j,σj ,σk Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ Pr(jˆ, kˆ)δ(σˆj 6= σˆk)D∗(pˆj , pˆk), now we define a sim-
ilar concept
TotalDivergence =
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)D∗(pˆj , pˆk)
First note that total divergence is robust to summing over j, k or j 6= k since when j = k,
D∗(pˆj , pˆk) = 0.
We can see TotalDivergence ≥ Diversity since TotalDivergence also includes the divergence
between the agents who report the same signals. We show that the equality holds if and only if
Inconsistency = 0:
Claim 5.4. For any strategy profile s, Diversity(s) = TotalDivergence(s) ⇔ Inconsistency(s) = 0
Corollary 5.5. ClassificationScore(truth-telling)=Diversity(truth-telling)=TotalDivergence(truth-
telling)
Proof. At the truth-telling equilibrium, σˆi = σi, pˆi = qσi for any i, so the inconsistency score of
truth-telling is 0 since σˆj = σˆk ⇒ σj = σk ⇒ pˆj = pˆk ⇒ D∗(pˆj , pˆk) = 0 which implies this
corollary.
Now we begin to state our proof outline: For any equilibrium s, we define two modified strategies
for s:
1. We define sBP what we call a best prediction strategy of s as a strategy where each agent uses
the same signal strategy which he uses in s but plays his best prediction which maximizes
the prediction score. In this case, based on Claim 2.12, for any i, agent i plays θ−iqσi . We
illustrate the report profiles of sBP in the second picture from the left in Figure 1.
2. We define symmetrized sBP as a strategy where each agent plays θ¯nqσ given σ is his private
signal where θ¯n is the average signal strategy of sBP (also of s). We show the report profiles
of symmetrized sBP in the third picture of Figure 1
Our proof can be divided in four parts which are illustrated in Figure 1:
(1) ClassificationScore(s) ≤ TotalDivergence(sBP ).[ Lemma 5.6 ]. This is our main lemma
and we defer the proof of main lemma to Section 5.3. Once we show it, we can directly prove
that the modified mechanism has truth-telling as symmetric quasi-focal equilibrium based on
information monotonicity which will be described in our proof for main theorem.
(2) TotalDivergence(sBP ) ≈ TotalDivergence(symmetrized sBP ) when the number of
agents is sufficient large. [Lemma 5.7] Intuitively, when n is large enough, θ−j will be
close to θ¯n. We will use this observation to prove this part.
(3) ClassificationScore(s∗) ≥ ClassificationScore(truthtelling)
⇒ TotalDivergence(truthtelling) ≈ TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP ) when the num-
ber of agents is sufficient large.[Corollary 5.8] Here s∗BP is the best prediction strategy of
s∗. This part will also imply no equilibrium can have ClassificationScore that is much greater
than truth-telling.
21
Figure 1: Proof Outline for Main Theorem
(4) TotalDivergence(truthtelling) ≈ TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP ) ⇒ θ¯n ≈ pi where
θ¯n is the average signal strategy of s
∗. [Lemma 5.9]
We will show TotalDivergence(truthtelling) is∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)D
∗(qσj ,qσk)
=
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)D
∗(θpiqσj , θpiqσk)
where Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk) is the probability that agent j, k are picked and agent j receives
private signal σj ; agent k receives private signal σk.
We will also show TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP ) is
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)D
∗(θ¯nqσj , θ¯nqσk).
Once we prove (1) and (2), we will show that (3) implies θ¯n ≈ pi. This, informally, means that
if an equilibrium pays more than truth-telling, it must be close to a permutation equilibrium,
and this pays about the same as truth-telling.
5.2 Proof for Main Theorem
(1)ClassificationScore(s) < TotalDivergence(sBP )
Lemma 5.6 (Main Lemma). For any equilibrium s, if sBP is a best prediction strategy of s, we
have
ClassificationScore(s) ≤ TotalDivergence(sBP )
If the equality holds, then we have Inconsistency(s) = 0 and s = sBP .
We defer the proof of our main lemma to Section 5.3.
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Theorem 4.3 Part 2: M+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) has truth-telling as a symmetric-quasi-focal equi-
librium. We use our main lemma directly to prove: any symmetric non-permutation equi-
librium’s agent welfare (ClassificationScore) must be strictly less than truth-telling
Notice that if all agents play a symmetric signal strategy θ, then for any j, k, θ−j = θ−k = θ.
For any symmetric non-permutation equilibrium s, it is possible that the signal strategy of s is not
a permutation or it is a permutation θpi but agents do not report piqσ given σ is their private signal.
So we consider two cases:
(a) We first consider the case that the signal strategy θ of s is a permutation matrix θpi, but
agents do not report piqσ.
ClassificationScore(s) <TotalDivergence(sBP )
=
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)D
∗(θ−jqσj , θ−kqσk)
=
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)D
∗(θpiqσj , θpiqσk)
=
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)D
∗(qσj ,qσk)
=TotalDivergence(truthtelling)
=ClassificationScore(truthtelling)
The first inequality follows from our main lemma. The inequality is strict for the following
reason: when the signal strategy θ of s is a permutation matrix, sBP is a permutation strategy
profile since for any i, agent i’s best prediction is θ−iqσ = θqσ. Based on our main lemma if
ClassificationScore(s) = TotalDivergence(sBP ), we have s = sBP which implies that s is a permu-
tation strategy profile which is a contradiction to the fact s is a non-permutation strategy profile.
The second line follows since at sBP , each agent’s reported prediction only depends on his
private signal.
The last equality follows from Corollary 5.5.
(b) We consider the case that the signal strategy θ of s is not a permutation matrix. The
above proof still holds except in two places: one is the inequality in the first line may not be strict;
another is the equality in the fourth line should be a strict inequality:∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)D
∗(θpiqσj , θpiqσk)
<
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)D
∗(qσj ,qσk)
The inequality must be strict since based on Corollary 2.19, we know that if θ is not a permutation,
and Q is fine-grained, then there exists σ1 6= σ2 such that D∗(θqσ1 , θqσ2) < D∗(qσ1 ,qσ2). Also
based on non-zero assumption of Q, we have Pr(σj = σ1, σk = σ2) > 0.
So in both of the above two cases, we have
ClassificationScore(s) < ClassificationScore(truthtelling)
if s is not a permutation equilibrium
Things are more complicated if agents play asymmetric equilibria, and we begin to handle this
case by showing Lemma 5.7, Corollary 5.8, and Lemma 5.9.
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(2) TotalDivergence(sBP ) ≈ TotalDivergence(symmetrized sBP ) when the number of
agents is sufficient large. We symmetrize sBP which means we let each agent i report θ¯nqσi
given σi is agent i’s private signal and θ¯n is the average signal strategy of sBP and show that the
total divergence will not change much. Intuitively, this is because θ−i are similar among agents
when there are many agents.
Lemma 5.7. Given any SNIFE prior Q, for any  > 0, there exists N =
32∗m2
2
such that if
n > N, for any strategy (θ1, θ2, ..., θn), any two agents j, k,
|D∗(θ−jqσj , θ−kqσk)−D∗(θ¯nqσj , θ¯nqσk)| < 
Proof of Lemma 5.7. For convenience, let s = σj , t = σk
|D∗(θ−jqs, θ−kqt)−D∗(θ¯nqs, θ¯nqt)| (19)
=|
∑
u
(√
θ−j(u, ·)qs −
√
θ−k(u, ·)qt
)2
−
(√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs −
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qt
)2
| (20)
=|
∑
u
(√
θ−j(u, ·)qs −
√
θ−k(u, ·)qt −
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs +
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qt
)
∗(√
θ−j(u, ·)qs −
√
θ−k(u, ·)qt +
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs −
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qt
)
| (21)
≤2 ∗m ∗max
u
(
|
√
θ−j(u, ·)qs −
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs|+ |
√
θ−k(u, ·)qt −
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qt|
)
(22)
≤4 ∗m ∗max
u,s,j
|
√
θ−j(u, ·)qs −
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs| (23)
The first equality follows from the definition of Helinger-divergence.
The second equality is just formula for the difference of square.
To arrive at (22),
∑
u |
(√
θ−j(u, ·)qs −
√
θ−k(u, ·)qt +
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs −
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qt
)
| ≤∑u 2 =
2m where the inequality follows from the fact 0 < D∗ < 1.
The last equality follows since both |√θ−j(u, ·)qs−√θ¯n(u, ·)qs| and |√θ−k(u, ·)qt−√θ¯n(u, ·)qt|
are less than maxu,s,j |
√
θ−j(u, ·)qs −
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs|.
Now we consider two cases for any u, s, j:
(1) |√θ−j(u, ·)qs −√θ¯n(u, ·)qs| ≤ 4∗m : It is clear the result in this Lemma follows.
(2) |√θ−j(u, ·)qs −√θ¯n(u, ·)qs| > 4∗m : Notice that (n− 1)θ−j = nθ¯n − θj , then we can see
θ−j = θ¯n +
1
n
(θ−j − θj)
4 ∗m ∗ |
√
θ−j(u, ·)qs −
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs| (24)
= 4 ∗m ∗ | θ−j(u, ·)qs − θ¯n(u, ·)qs√
θ−j(u, ·)qs +
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs
| (25)
= 4 ∗m ∗
1
n |(θ−j(u, ·)− θj(u, ·))qs|√
θ−j(u, ·)qs +
√
θ¯n(u, ·)qs
(26)
< 4 ∗m ∗ 2 ∗ 4 ∗m

1
n
<  (27)
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when n > N =
32∗m2
2
The first equality follows from the formula of the difference of squares.
The second equality follows from θ−j = θ¯n + 1n(θ−j − θj).
If |√θ−j(u, ·)qs −√θ¯n(u, ·)qs| > 4∗m , we have |√θ−j(u, ·)qs +√θ¯n(u, ·)qs| > 4∗m as well, the
third line follows.
(3) ClassificationScore(s∗) ≥ ClassificationScore(truthtelling)
⇒ TotalDivergence(truthtelling) ≈ TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP ) when the number
of agents is sufficient large. The below corollary is derived from Lemma 5.7. It will imply
not only
TotalDivergence(truthtelling) ≈ TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP ) but also any equilibrium can-
not have agent-welfare (ClassificationScore) that is much greater than truth-telling when the num-
ber of agents is sufficient large.
Corollary 5.8. Given any SNIFE prior Q, for any  > 0, if n > N =
128∗m2
2
, for any equilibrium
s∗ that has greater ClassificationScore than the truth-telling ClassificationScore minus /2:
Classification(truthtelling)
< Classification(s∗) +

2
< TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP ) + 
≤ Classification(truthtelling) + 
Proof for Corollary 5.8.
TotalDivergence(truthtelling) = ClassificationScore(truthtelling)
≤ ClassificationScore(s∗) + 
2
≤ TotalDivergence(s∗BP ) +

2
< TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP ) + 
≤ ClassificationScore(truthtelling) + 
The first equality follows from Corollary 5.5.
The second inequality follows from the condition.
The third inequality follows from the main lemma.
The fourth inequality follows from Lemma 5.7.
The last inequality follows from information monotonicity since
ClassificationScore(truthtelling)− TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP )
=
∑
j
k 6=j
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)D
∗(qσj ,qσk)−
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)D
∗(θ¯nqσj , θ¯nqσk)
=
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)(D
∗(qσj ,qσk)−D∗(θ¯nqσj , θ¯nqσk)) ≥ 0
The second equality follows since if j = k, D∗(qσj ,qσk) = 0
This corollary induces the following result:
25
No equilibrium can have agent-welfare that is much greater than truth-telling Let

2 = γ2, we need n ≥ 128∗m
2
2
to obtain γ2 tolerance based on Corollary 5.8. By manipulations, we
obtain our result.
(3) ⇒ (4) θ¯n ≈ pi We already know that if s∗ obtains higher ClassificationScore than truth-
telling, the classification score of truth-telling is close to that of the symmetrized s∗BP . Now we will
prove that θ¯n is close to a permutation where θ¯n is the average signal strategy of s
∗. We prove it
by contradiction. We first assume that θ¯n is far from a permutation equilibrium, that is, recalling
the definition of τ -close, we assume there exists a row of θ¯n that has at least two large numbers.
Formally, we assume that given any τ , there exists u′, v′, w′ ∈ Σ such that θ¯n(u′, v′) > τ, θ¯n(u′, w′) >
τ . We will prove that it is impossible when n > N(τ,Q) since when θ¯n is far from a permutation,
the total divergence of symmetrized sBP is far from the classification score of truth-telling which
contradicts Corollary 5.8.
The below lemma tells us if a symmetric strategy sθ, where agents play θ as their signal strategy
and best prediction as their reported prediction, is far from a permutation, then the total divergence
of sθ and total divergence of permutation are also far. Once we proved the below lemma, we
can replace θ by θ¯n to finish our proof for Theorem 4.3 part 4, that is, truth-telling is robust-
approximate-quasi-focal.
Lemma 5.9. Given any fixed τ , for any signal strategy θ, if there exists u′, v′, w′ ∈ Σ such that
θ(u′, v′) > τ, θ(u′, w′) > τ , then consider the case sθ that all agents play θ as their signal strategy
and report their best prediction, we have
TotalDivergence(truthtelling)− TotalDivergence(sθ) ≥ c2(τc1)3c4c3
Proof of Lemma 5.9. We first write TotalDivergence in an explicit form:
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)D
∗(qσj ,qσk)−
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)D
∗(θqσj , θqσk) (28)
Actually, We will show for any j, k,∑
σj ,σk
Pr(σj , σk)D
∗(qσj ,qσk)−
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(σj , σk)D
∗(θqσj , θqσk) (29)
is greater than c2(τc1)
3c4c3, which implies the result.
We want give a lower bound for (29). In order to obtain this lower bound, we are going to
transform this value to
∑
u λug(xu) − g(
∑
u λuxu) where g(·) is a convex function. To obtain a
lower bound of
∑
u λug(xu)− g(
∑
u λuxu), we have an observation:
For any convex function g(·), g(∑u λuxu) and ∑u λug(xu) are “very different” if there are two
large coefficients λ1 and λ2 with the corresponding x1 and x2 that are “very different”. Now we
introduce a claim to show this observation.
Claim 5.10. ∑
u
λug(xu)− g(
∑
u
λuxu) ≥ d2(g)
2
λ1λ2
λ1 + λ2
||x1 − x2||2
where d2(g) is a lower bound of g
′′(·)
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Proof.
g
(∑
u
λuxu
)
≤ (λ1 + λ2)g
(
λ1x1 + λ2x2
λ1 + λ2
)
+
∑
u>2
λug(xu) ≤
∑
u
λug(xu)
So ∑
u
λug(xu)− g(
∑
u
λuxu)
≥
∑
u
λug(xu)− (λ1 + λ2)g
(
λ1x1 + λ2x2
λ1 + λ2
)
−
∑
u>2
λug(xu)
= λ1g(x1) + λ2g(x2)− (λ1 + λ2)g(λ1x1 + λ2x2
λ1 + λ2
)
= (λ1 + λ2)(
λ1g(x1) + λ2g(x2)
λ1 + λ2
− g(λ1x1 + λ2x2
λ1 + λ2
))
≥ (λ1 + λ2)d2(g)
2
λ1λ2
(λ1 + λ2)2
||x1 − x2||2
=
d2(g)
2
λ1λ2
λ1 + λ2
||x1 − x2||2
where d2(g) is the lower bound of g
′′(·)
The first inequality follows if we rewrite
∑
u λuxu as (λ1 +λ2)
λ1x1+λ2x2
λ1+λ2
+
∑
u>2 λuxu and apply
convexity.
Then we do several manipulations including taking λ1 + λ2 outside. For continuous convex
function g(·), we have tg(x) + (1− t)g(y)− g(tx+ (1− t)y) ≥ 12d2(g)t(1− t)||x− y||2 according to
[13], then we replace t by λ1λ1+λ2 and set x = x1, y = x2 and obtain the final result.
We can think of θ(u′, v′) and θ(u′, w′) as the two large coefficients (actually they are part of the
coefficients). Then we need to find two “very different” entries that corresponding to those large
coefficients. We pick two specific signals s′, t′ ∈ Σ such that qs′ and qt′ are “very different” in
position v′ and w′. The reason we do this is that when we compute θq, θ(u′, v′) and θ(u′, w′) are
the two large entries which correspond to the positions v′ and w′ in q. Formally, we pick s′, t′ ∈ Σ
such that ∥∥∥∥q(v′|s′)q(v′|t′) − q(w′|s′)q(w′|t′)
∥∥∥∥ = maxs,t
∥∥∥∥q(v′|s)q(v′|t) − q(w′|s)q(w′|t)
∥∥∥∥
Once we have chosen the two specific signals, since Pr(s′, t′)(D∗(qs′ ,qt′)−D∗(θqs′ , θqt′)) is less
than (29) based on the fact D∗(qs,qt)−D∗(θqs, θqt) ≥ 0 for s, t 6= s′, t′, we will give a lower bound
of Pr(s′, t′)(D∗(qs′ ,qt′)−D∗(θqs′ , θqt′)) which is also a lower bound of (29).
Let f(x) = (
√
x−1)2. For convenience, we will write the dot product of two vectors∑v a(v)b(v)
as a(·)b(·). Now we give a explicit form of D∗:
Pr(s′, t′)(D∗(qs′ ,qt′)−D∗(θqs′ , θqt′)) (30)
= Pr(s′, t′)
(∑
v
q(v|s′)f
(
q(v|t′)
q(v|s′)
)
−
∑
u
θ(u, ·)q(·|s′)f
(
1
θ(u, ·)q(·|s′)θ(u, ·)q(·|t
′)
))
(31)
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We take
∑
u θ(u, ·)q(·|s′) out and note that
∑
u θ(u, v) = 1, so
∑
u θ(u, ·)q(·|s′) 1θ(u,·)q(·|s′)θ(u, v) =
1, then we obtain (32) from (31).
(31) =Pr(s′, t′)
∑
u
θ(u, ·)q(·|s′)∗(
1
θ(u, ·)q(·|s′)
∑
v
θ(u, v)q(v|s′)f
(
q(v|t′)
q(v|s′)
)
− f
(
1
θ(u, ·)q(·|s′)
∑
v
θ(u, v)q(v|s′) q(v|t
′)
q(v|s′)
))
(32)
Then we pick the special u′ to obtain (33). For the part
∑
u6=u′ , since f(·) is a convex function,
we have
1
θ(u, ·)q(·|s′)
∑
v
θ(u, v)q(v|s′)f( q(v|t
′)
q(v|s′)) ≥ f
(
1
θ(u, ·)q(·|s′)
∑
v
θ(u, v)q(v|s′) q(v|t
′)
q(v|s′)
)
so (32) is greater than (33).
(32) ≥Pr(s′, t′)θ(u′, ·)q(·|s′)∗(
1
θ(u′, ·)q(·|s′)
∑
v
θ(u′, v)q(v|s′)f
(
q(v|t′)
q(v|s′)
)
− f
(
1
θ(u′, ·)q(·|s′)
∑
v
θ(u′, v)q(v|s′) q(v|t
′)
q(v|s′)
))
(33)
Note that θ(u′, v′) and θ(u′, w′) are large, so in the convex function f(·), there are two large
coefficients 1θ(u′,·)q(·|s′)θ(u
′, v′)q(v′|s′) and 1θ(u′,·)q(·|s′)θ(u′, w′)q(w′|s′) which correspond to q(v
′|t′)
q(v′|s′) and
q(w′|t′)
q(w′|s′) . Then based on our choice for s
′, t′ and Claim 5.10, we have
(33) ≥Pr(s′, t′)θ(u′, ·)q(·|s′)c4
2
(
(θ(u′, v′)q(v′|s′)) ∗ (θ(v′, w′)q(w′|s′))
θ(u′, v′)q(v′|s′) + θ(v′, w′)q(w′|s′)
∥∥∥∥ q(v′|t′)q(v′|s′) − q(w′|t′)q(w′|s′)
∥∥∥∥2
)
(34)
≥c2(τc1)3c4c3 (35)
The last inequality follows since Pr(s′, t′) ≥ c2, both θ(u′, v′)q(v′|s′) and θ(v′, w′)q(w′|s′) are
greater than τc1. Also note that:
θ(u′, ·)q(·|s′) ≥ θ(u′, v′)q(v′|s′) + θ(v′, w′)q(w′|s′) ≥ 2τc1
and
θ(u′, v′)q(v′|s′) + θ(v′, w′)q(w′|s′) ≤ 1.
Theorem 4.3 Part 3: M+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) has truth-telling as a (τ1, γ1)-robust-symmetric-
quasi-focal :
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Any symmetric equilibrium that has agent-welfare close to truth-telling must be close
to a permutation equilibrium: We have already proved that no symmetric equilibrium pays
more than truth-telling. For the symmetric equilibrium s∗ such that ClassificationScore(s∗) >
ClassificationScore(truthtelling)− γ1, we have
TotalDivergence(truthtelling) = ClassificationScore(truthtelling) ≤ ClassificationScore(s∗) + γ1
≤TotalDivergence(s∗BP ) + γ1 ≤ ClassificationScore(truthtelling) + γ1
Let γ1 = (τ1c1)
3c2c3c4, then s
∗ is τ1 close to a permutation equilibrium or there will be a
contradiction based on Lemma 5.9. By manipulations, we will obtain our result.
Theorem 4.3 Part 4: M+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) has truth-telling as a (τ2, γ2)-robust-approximate-
quasi-focal :
If the number of agents is sufficient large, any equilibrium that has agent-welfare close
to truth-telling must be close to permutation equilibrium: Let  = (τ2c1)
3c2c3c4, if n >
32∗m2
(/2)2
, we have already proved that TotalDivergence(truthtelling)−TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP ) <
 based on Corollary 5.8. If s∗ is not τ2 close to a permutation equilibrium, we will have
TotalDivergence(truthtelling)− TotalDivergence(symmetrized s∗BP ) > (τ2c1)3c2c3c4 = 
which is a contradiction based on Lemma 5.9. By manipulations, we obtain our result.
5.3 Proof for Main Lemma
In this section, we will pove the main lemma: the classification score of non-permutation equilibrium
s is less than the total divergence of the report profiles when agents report their best predictions
given they still use the signal strategy of s. We first show the inequality and then show that if the
equality holds, then s is consistent and s = sBP .
In order to show the inequality, we first show
TotalDivergence(s)− TotalDivergence(sBP ) ≤ Inconsistency(s)
once we show this, since we have ClassificationScore = Diversity − Inconsistency and Diversity ≤
TotalDivergence, our main lemma ClassificationScore(s) ≤ TotalDivergence(sBP ) will follow since
ClassificationScore(s) =Diversity(s)− Inconsistency(s)
≤TotalDivergence(s)− Inconsistency(s) ≤ TotalDivergence(sBP ) (36)
To prove TotalDivergence(s) − TotalDivergence(sBP ) ≤ Inconsistency(s), we will write it in a
explicit form:
TotalDivergence(s)− TotalDivergence(sBP ) (37)
=
∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)(D∗(pˆj , pˆk)−D∗(θ−jqσj , θ−kqσk)) (38)
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It is difficult to compare D∗(pˆj , pˆk) and D∗(θ−jqσj , θ−kqσk) directly. To deal with this problem,
we introduce a new value D∗(pˆj , θ−kqσk) and write (37) as∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)∗∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)
(
D∗(pˆj , pˆk)−D∗(pˆj , θ−kqσk) +D∗(pˆj , θ−kqσk)−D∗(θ−jqσj , θ−kqσk)
)
(39)
We will first give the analysis for D∗(pˆj , pˆk)−D∗(pˆj , θ−kqσk), then we will see D∗(pˆj , θ−kqσk)−
D∗(θ−jqσj , θ−kqσk) is similar.
Remember that both D∗(a, ·) and D∗(·, b) are convex functions. So D∗(pˆj , pˆk)−D∗(pˆj , θ−kqσk)
can be seen as g(pˆk)− g(θ−kqσk) where g(·) is convex function D∗(pˆj , ·).
Recall that
Inconsistency =
∑
j
k 6=j
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)δ(σˆj = σˆk)
√
D∗(pˆj , pˆk)
We hope we can obtain a upper bound for g(pˆk)−g(θ−kqσk) that relates to agent k’s neighbors’
best response predictions. Here agent k’s neighbors mean the agents who report the same signal
with agent k and best response prediction means the reported prediction at equilibrium.
Now we begin to analyze the relationship between pˆk and θ−kqσk . Recall that each agent’s
payment depends on his prediction score and information score. θ−kqσk maximizes the prediction
score while pˆk maximizes the payment. The information score depends on agent k’s neighbors’
reported predictions {pˆl|l 6= k}. So we can see pˆk is related to both his best prediction θ−kqσk and
his neighbors’ reported predictions {pˆl|l 6= k}. Actually we will show that pˆk can be computed
as a linear combination of θ−kqσk and {pˆl|l 6= k}, which is based on the fact that every proper
scoring rule is linear for the first entry (we will discuss the detail in the below proof). Once we
have this result, we can construct a linear system about agents’ reported predictions {pˆi|i} and
their best predictions. This linear system helps us obtain a upper bound for g(pˆk) − g(θ−kqσk)
which upper-bounds the distance between agent k’s best response prediction and his neighbors’
best response predictions.
Equilibrium Analysis We will analyze the equilibrium in our Truthful Mechanism which is also
the equilibrium in our Disagreement Mechanism. We first show, in Claim 5.11, that at equilibrium,
an agent’s reported prediction only depends on his private signal and reported signal. Then we use
this property to construct a linear system and via this linear system, we obtain a upper bound for
g(pˆk)− g(θ−kqσk) in Claim 5.12.
Claim 5.11. At any equilibrium s = (s1, ..., sn), for each agent i, fix s−i, agent i’s private signal
σi ∈ Σ and reported signal σˆi ∈ Σ, then there exists a unique prediction which is agent i’s best
response.
We define this unique prediction as pˆ(i, σi, σˆi)
In other words, si(σi) is a distribution over at most m vectors: {(σˆi, pˆ(i, σi, σˆi))|σˆi ∈ Σ} and
Pr(σˆi,pˆi)←si(σ)(σˆi, pˆi) =
{
θi(σˆi, σi) pˆi = pˆ(i, σi, σˆi)
0 pˆi 6= pˆ(i, σi, σˆi)
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Proof. For any agent i, assume his private signal is σi and he reports σˆi at equilibrium (s1, s2, ..., sn).
Now we will prove there is a unique prediction that maximize agent i’s payment.
arg max
pˆ
E[payment(i,M+)|σi] (40)
= arg max
pˆ
αPS(θ−iqσi , pˆ) + β
∑
j 6=i
Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj |σi)
∫
σˆj ,pˆj
Pr(σˆj ,pˆj)←sj(σj)(σˆj , pˆj)δ(σˆi = σˆj)PS(pˆj , pˆ)
(41)
= arg max
pˆ
α+ β∑
j 6=i
Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj |σi)
∫
σˆj ,pˆj
Pr(σˆj ,pˆj)←sj(σj)(σˆj , pˆj)δ(σˆi = σˆj)

PS(
αθ−iqσi + β
∑
j 6=i Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj |σi)
∫
σˆj ,pˆj
Pr(σˆj ,pˆj)←sj(σj)(σˆj , pˆj)δ(σˆi = σˆj)pˆj
α+ β
∑
j 6=i Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj |σi)
∫
σˆj ,pˆj
Pr(σˆj ,pˆj)←sj(σj)(σˆj , pˆj)δ(σˆi = σˆj)
, pˆ) (42)
=
αθ−iqσi + β
∑
j 6=i Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj |σi)
∫
σˆj ,pˆj
Pr(σˆj ,pˆj)←sj(σj)(σˆj , pˆj)δ(σˆi = σˆj)pˆj
α+ β
∑
j 6=i Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj |σi)
∫
σˆj ,pˆj
Pr(σˆj ,pˆj)←sj(σj)(σˆj , pˆj)δ(σˆi = σˆj)
(43)
In equation (41), the first part is the prediction score of agent i, the second part is part of the
information score of agent i. Note that for the information score PS(pˆj , pˆ)−PS(pˆj , pˆj) of agent i,
only PS(pˆj , pˆ) is related to agent i’s reported prediction pˆ so we only consider this part to analyze
the equilibrium. Pr(j) is the probability that agent j is matched with agent i, Pr(σj |σi) is the
probability that agent j receives σj given agent i receives σi. Then given agent j’s strategy sj and
private signal, we integrate over agent j possible report profiles and only consider the case σˆi = σˆj .
The second equality follows since proper scoring rule is linear for the first entry.
The last equality follows since we obtain the highest value only if pˆ equals the first entry based
on the property of strict proper scoring rule.
The below claim tells us we can bound the distance between each agent’s best response pre-
diction (the prediction which maximizes his total reward) and his best prediction (the prediction
which maximizes his prediciton score) by the distance between his best response prediction and his
neighbors’ best response predictions.
Claim 5.12. For any convex function g(·), for any σi and σˆi, we have
αPr(σi)(g(pˆ(i, σi, σˆi))−g(θ−iqσi)) ≤ β
∑
j 6=i
Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj , σi)θj(σˆi, σj)(g(pˆ(j, σj , σˆi))−g(pˆ(i, σi, σˆi)))
Proof. Based on Claim 5.11, we can rewrite (40)=(42) as a n×m×m linear system about
{pˆ(k, σk, σˆk)|k ∈ [1, n], σk ∈ Σ, σˆk ∈ Σ}:
pˆ(i, σi, σˆi) = arg max
pˆ
E[payment(i,M+)|σi] (44)
=
αθ−iqσi + β
∑
j 6=i Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj |σi)θj(σˆi, σj)pˆ(j, σj , σˆi)
α+ β
∑
j 6=i Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj |σi)θj(σˆi, σj) (45)
Fix i, let λi =
α
α+β
∑
j 6=i Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj |σi)θj(σˆi,σj) , λj,σj =
β
∑
j 6=i Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj |σi)θj(σˆi,σj)
α+β
∑
j 6=i Pr(j)
∑
σj
Pr(σj |σi)θj(σˆi,σj) for
j 6= i and σj ∈ Σ, we have λi +
∑
j 6=i,σj λj,σj = 1
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Based on the convexity of g(·), we have
g(pˆ(i, σi, σˆi)) = g(λiθ−iqσi +
∑
j 6=i,σj
λj,σj pˆ(j, σj , σˆi))
≤ λig(θ−iqσi) +
∑
j 6=i,σj
λj,σjg(pˆ(j, σj , σˆi))
After substitutions, we multiply
(
α+ βPr(j)
∑
j 6=i
∑
σj
Pr(σj |σi)θj(σˆi, σj)
)
Pr(σi) in both sides.
Note that Pr(σi)Pr(σj |σi) = Pr(σj , σi), then by manipulation, the claim follows.
Claim 5.12 gives an upper bound to g(pˆk) − g(θ−kqσk) that is the distance between agent k’s
best response prediction and his neighbors’ best response predictions. Now we continue the proof
for our main lemma.
To bound∑
j,k,σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)∗∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)(D∗(pˆj , pˆk)−D∗(pˆj , θ−kqσk) +D∗(pˆj , θ−kqσk)−D∗(θ−jqσj , θ−kqσk)) (46)
We rewrite
∫
jˆ,kˆ Pr(jˆ, kˆ) as θj(σˆj , σj)θk(σˆk, σk) and pˆj as pˆ(j, σj , σˆj), pˆk as pˆ(k, σk, σˆk) which
we can do because of Claim 5.11.
We first give an upper bound to∑
j,k
∑
σj ,σk,σˆj ,σˆk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)θj(σˆj , σj)θk(σˆk, σk)(D
∗(pˆ(j, σj , σˆj), pˆ(k, σk, σˆk))−D∗(pˆ(j, σj , σˆj), θ−kqσk))
The analysis for the second part is similar.
Based on Claim 5.12, we have
∑
j,k
∑
σj ,σk,σˆj ,σˆk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)θj(σˆj , σj)θk(σˆk, σk)(D
∗(pˆ(j, σj , σˆj), pˆ(k, σk, σˆk))−D∗(pˆ(j, σj , σˆj), θ−kqσk))
(47)
≤
∑
j,k
∑
σj ,σk,σˆj ,σˆk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)θj(σˆj , σj)θk(σˆk, σk) (48)
β
αPr(σk)
∑
l 6=k
∑
σl
Pr(l)Pr(σl, σk)θl(σˆk, σl)(D
∗(pˆ(j, σj , σˆj), pˆ(l, σl, σˆk))−D∗(pˆ(j, σj , σˆj), pˆ(k, σk, σˆk)))
(49)
Since
Pr(σj ,σk)
Pr(σk)
≤ 1, we obtain (50) from (49).
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(49) ≤
∑
j,k
∑
σj ,σk,σˆj ,σˆk
Pr(j, k)θj(σˆj , σj)θk(σˆk, σk)
β
α
∑
l 6=k
∑
σl
Pr(l)Pr(σl, σk)θl(σˆk, σl)(D
∗(pˆ(j, σj , σˆj), pˆ(l, σl, σˆk))−D∗(pˆ(j, σj , σˆj), pˆ(k, σk, σˆk)))
(50)
≤
∑
j,k
∑
σj ,σk,σˆj ,σˆk
Pr(j, k)θj(σˆj , σj)θk(σˆk, σk)
β
α
∑
l 6=k
∑
σl
Pr(l)Pr(σl, σk)θl(σˆk, σl)|(D∗(pˆ(j, σj , σˆj), pˆ(l, σl, σˆk))−D∗(pˆ(j, σj , σˆj), pˆ(k, σk, σˆk)))|
(51)
Note that (51) and (50) are identical except for the value sign.
Then we obtain (52) from (51) since
|D∗(x, y)−D∗(x, z)| ≤ (
√
D∗(x, y) +
√
D∗(x, z))|
√
D∗(x, y)−
√
D∗(x, z))|
≤ 2|
√
D∗(x, y)−
√
D∗(x, z))|
The second inequality follows since 0 ≤ D∗ ≤ 1
(51) ≤2
∑
j,k
∑
σj ,σk,σˆj ,σˆk
Pr(j, k)θj(σˆj , σj)θk(σˆk, σk)
β
α
∑
l 6=k
∑
σl
Pr(l)Pr(σl, σk)θl(σˆk, σl)
|(
√
D∗(pˆ(j, σj , σˆj), pˆ(l, σl, σˆk))−
√
D∗(pˆ(j, σj , σˆj), pˆ(k, σk, σˆk)))| (52)
Once we get (52), we can use the fact that
√
D∗ is metric which implies the triangle inequality;
(53) follows.
(52) ≤2
∑
j,k
∑
σj ,σk,σˆj ,σˆk
Pr(j, k)θj(σˆj , σj)θk(σˆk, σk)
β
α
∑
l 6=k
∑
σl
Pr(l)Pr(σl, σk)θl(σˆk, σl)(
√
D∗(pˆ(k, σk, σˆk), pˆ(l, σl, σˆk))) (53)
Note that
∑
σj
∑
σˆj
θj(σˆj , σj) =
∑
σj
1 = m, also we have
∑
j Pr(l) =
∑
j Pr(j) = 1, Pr(k, l) =
Pr(j, k) then (54) follows.
(53) =2m
β
α
∑
l
∑
k 6=l
∑
σk,σˆk
Pr(k, l)θk(σˆk, σk)
∑
σl
Pr(σl, σk)θl(σˆk, σl)(
√
D∗(pˆ(k, σk, σˆk), pˆ(l, σl, σˆk)))
(54)
=2m
β
α
∑
k,l 6=k
∑
σk,σˆk,σl
Pr(k, l)θk(σˆk, σk)Pr(σl, σk)θl(σˆk, σl)(
√
D∗(pˆ(k, σk, σˆk), pˆ(l, σl, σˆk))) (55)
=2m
β
α
× Inconsistency (56)
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The analysis for the second part
∑
j,k
∑
σj ,σk,σˆj ,σˆk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)θj(σˆj , σj)θk(σˆk, σk)(D
∗(pˆ(j, σj , σˆj), θ−kqσk)−D∗(θ−jqσj , θ−kqσk))
is similar, note that j and k are symmetric and D∗(·, θ−kqσk) is a convex function. We can use
Claim 5.12 and triangle inequality to bound the second part by 2mβα × Inconsistency.
So if we set 2mβα <
1
2 , then TotalDivergence(s)−TotalDivergence(sBP ) < Inconsistency, proving
the inequality in our main lemma.
To prove that if the equality in our main lemma holds then s = sBP , we first show that
Claim 5.13. The equality in ClassificationScore(s) ≤ TotalDivergence(sBP ) holds iff
Inconsistency(s) = 0.
Proof. Note that (36) tells us when ClassificationScore(s) = TotalDivergence(sBP ), we have Diversity(s) =
TotalDivergence(s) which implies Inconsistency(s) = 0 based on Claim 5.4.
Then we will prove
Claim 5.14. If Inconsistency(s) = 0 then s = sBP
Proof. Recall in (44), we have for any i,
pˆ(i, σi, σˆi) = arg max
pˆ
E[payment(i,M+)|σi]
=
αθ−iqσi + βPr(j)
∑
j 6=i
∑
σj
Pr(σj |σi)θj(σˆi, σj)pˆ(j, σj , σˆi)
α+ βPr(j)
∑
j 6=i
∑
σj
Pr(σj |σi)θj(σˆi, σj) (57)
If Inconsistency(s) = 0, we can see if θj(σˆi, σj) > 0 we must have pˆ(j, σj , σˆi) = pˆi(i, σi, σˆi). So we
have θ−iqσi = pˆi(i, σi, σˆi) for any i since we have αθ−iqσi = αpˆi(i, σi, σˆi) if we multiply
α+ βPr(j)
∑
j 6=i
∑
σj
Pr(σj |σi)θj(σˆi, σj) in both sides of equation (57) and combine the fact that
pˆ(j, σj , σˆi) = pˆi(i, σi, σˆi). Thus we have s = sBP .
5.4 Proof for Claims
Claim 2.10. Assume that the distribution over all agents’ private signals is ω ∈ ∆Σ, the distribu-
tion over all agents’ reported signals will be θ¯nω.
Proof for Claim 2.10. The probability of signal σ will be∑
i
Pr(i)
∑
σ′
θi(σ, σ
′)ω(σ′) =
1
n
∑
i
∑
σ′
θi(σ, σ
′)ω(σ′) =
∑
σ′
θ¯n(σ, σ
′)ω(σ′)
where Pr(i) is the probability agent i is picked. For each agent i, we sum the probability agent i
receives private signal σ′ which is ω(σ′) times the probability that he reports σ given he receives
σ′ which is θi(σ, σ′) over all possible private signal σ′.
So the distribution of reported signals is θ¯nω.
Claim 2.12. For each agent i, if he receives private signal σi, agent i will believe that the expected
likelihood of other agents’ reported signals is θ−iqσi where θ−i =
∑
j 6=i θj
n−1 .
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Proof for Claim 2.12. For each agent i, given he receives private signal σi, he will believe the
expected likelihood for other agents’ private signals is qσi . Based on Claim 2.10, he will believe the
expected likelihood for other agents’ reported signals is the average signal strategy of other agents’
signal strategies times qσi which is θ−iqσi where θ−i =
∑
j 6=i θj
n−1 .
Claim 2.16. For any transition matrix θm×m where the sum of every column is 1, θ is a permu-
tation matrix iff for any row of θ, there at most one non-zero entry.
Proof for Claim 2.16. It is clear that any permutation matrix has exactly one non-zero entry, which
is 1, in each row and each column. Thus we only need to prove the direction that if for any row of
θ, there is at most one non-zero entry, θ must be a permutation matrix.
We first prove that there are exactly m non-zero entries in θ: if for any row of θ, there is at
most one non-zero entry, we can see θ has at most m non-zero entries. θ is a transition matrix
where the sum of every column is 1,which implies that θ has at least m non-zero entries. Thus we
proved there are exactly m non-zero entries in θ.
We have just shown that θ has exactly m non-zero entries. Since θ has at most one non-zero
entry in each row, θ must have exactly one non-zero entry in each row. θ also has at least one
non-zero entry in each column since it is a transition matrix, so θ must have exactly one non-zero
entry 1 in each column. Thus θ has exactly one non-zero entry 1 in each row and each column
which implies that θ is a permutation matrix.
Claim 4.4. The Disagreement Mechanism has the same equilibria as the Truthful Mechanism.
Proof for Claim 4.4. The value of scoreC(rj , rk) does not depend on agent i’s strategy. The term
related to agent i’s strategy contained in scoreM is paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(i, r). This implies that
agent i’s marginal benefit from deviation inM+(α, β, PS(·, ·)) is the same with its marginal benefit
from the same deviation in M(α, β, PS(·, ·)).
Claim 5.1.
ClassificationScore = Diversity− Inconsistency
Proof for Claim 5.1. Based on the definition of ClassificationScore, we have∑
i
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i,j
σi,σj ,σk
Pr(i)Pr(σi)Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk|σi)∗ (58)
∫
σˆj ,pˆj ,σˆk,pˆk
Pr(σˆj ,pˆj)←sj(σj)(σˆj , pˆj)Pr(σˆk,pˆk)←sk(σk)(σˆk, pˆk)scoreC(rj , rk) (59)
Now we begin our proof:
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∑
i
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i,j
σi,σj ,σk
Pr(i)Pr(σi)Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk|σi)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)scoreC(rj , rk)
=
∑
i
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i,j
σj ,σk
1
n(n− 1)(n− 2)Pr(σj , σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)scoreC(rj , rk)
=
1
n(n− 1)
∑
j
k 6=j
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(σj , σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)scoreC(rj , rk)
=
∑
j
k 6=j
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)scoreC(rj , rk)
The first equality follows since fix j, k, scoreC(rj , rk) does not depend on i and
we also have
∑
σi
Pr(σi)Pr(σj , σk|σi) = Pr(σj , σk).
The second equality follows since for any (j, k), j 6= k pair, there are n − 2 numbers that are
neither j nor k which means (j, k) will repeat n− 2 times since there are n− 2 possible i.
By definition we can see ClassificationScore = Diversity− Inconsistency.
Claim 5.2. Any permutation strategy profile has the same ClassificationScore, Diversity, and In-
consistency with truth-telling.
Proof for Claim 5.2. Any permutation strategy profile’s report profiles can be seen as a relabeling
to truth-telling’s report profiles, which implies the claim.
Claim 5.3. The average agent-welfare in our Disagreement Mechanism is ClassificationScore
Proof for Claim 5.3. We only need to prove
∑
i scoreM(i, r) = 0.∑
i
scoreM(i, r) =
∑
i∈A
scoreM(i, r) +
∑
i∈B
scoreM(i, r)
=
∑
i∈A
(
paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(i, r)−
1
|A|
∑
i∈B
paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(i, r)
)
+
∑
i∈B
(
paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(i, r)−
1
|B|
∑
i∈A
paymentM(α,β,PS(·,·))(i, r)
)
= 0
Claim 5.4. For any strategy profile s, Diversity(s) = TotalDivergence(s) ⇔ Inconsistency(s) = 0
Proof for Claim 5.4. Note that
TotalDivergence(s)−Diversity(s)
=
∑
j
k 6=j
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)δ(σˆj = σˆk)D
∗(pˆj , pˆk)
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while
Inconsistency(s) =
∑
j
k 6=j
∑
σj ,σk
Pr(j, k)Pr(σj , σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ
Pr(jˆ, kˆ)δ(σˆj = σˆk)
√
D∗(pˆj , pˆk)
Because each part in TotalDivergence(s) − Diversity(s) is non-negative, TotalDivergence(s) −
Diversity(s) = 0 will imply Pr(σj , σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ Pr(jˆ, kˆ)δ(σˆj = σˆk)D
∗(pˆj , pˆk) = 0.
So we have Pr(jˆ, kˆ)δ(σˆj = σˆk) = 0 orD
∗(pˆj , pˆk) = 0 which implies Pr(σj , σk)
∫
jˆ,kˆ Pr(jˆ, kˆ)δ(σˆj =
σˆk)
√
D∗(pˆj , pˆk) = 0. The proof for another direction is similar.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that our Disagreement Mechanism promotes truth-telling by 1) having truth-telling
as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium; 2) having no other symmetric equilibrium with agent welfare more
than the truth-telling equilibrium; 3) having the agent welfare of any equilibrium approach that
of truth-telling as the number of agents increases; 4) requiring that any equilibrium with agent
welfare close to that of truth-telling must be close to a permutation strategy.
We have argued, that our mechanism is near optimal in the sense that no truthful mechanism
without knowledge of the common prior can avoid having permutation equilibrium with high agent
welfare, and, in our mechanism, any equilibrium with agent welfare even close to that of truth-telling
must be close to a permutation equilibrium.
Permutation equilibria are intuitively unnatural and risky as they require extreme coordination
amongst the agents. We believe they are very unlikely to occur in practice. Additionally, any
asymmetric equilibrium also seem unlikely, especially as the number of agents increases because a)
such deviations help less as the number of agents’ increases; b) implementing such deviations will
become increasingly difficult as the number of agents increases. Thus our results about symmetric
equilibria and equilibrium in general are quite strong, despite the impossibility result.
In addition to the above results, our work has several contributions in the techniques employed:
(1) In a common prior setting, agents with the same private information cannot agree to dis-
agree. Thus, agents with the same signal should report similarly. Our Disagreement Mechanism
encourages not only agents with the same private information to agree, but also agents with differ-
ent private information to disagree. We do this by employing tools from information theory, namely
Information Monotonicity. Despite their natural and powerful application, to our knowledge, this
is the first time such tools have been explicitly employed in the peer prediction literature.
(2) Additionally, we created a framework for understanding the space of equilibrium which was
integral to our results.
We hope that both the information theory tools and the new understanding of equilibrium
introduced in this work will continue to provide useful insights for designing and analyzing future
mechanisms in peer-prediction and related settings.
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7 Appendix
To understand the strictness condition more in Lemma 2.18, we give an example where the strictness
condition is not satisfied:
Example 7.1. p = (0.1 0.2 0.7), q = (0.2 0.4 0.4), θ =
 0.3 0.6 00.7 0.4 0
0 0 1
.
We show by case analysis that we cannot find σ, σ′, σ′′ such that θ(σ, σ′)p(σ′) > 0, θ(σ, σ′′)p(σ′′) >
0 and p(σ
′′)
p(σ′) 6= q(σ
′′)
q(σ′) .
First note that because p(σ
′′)
p(σ′) 6= q(σ
′′)
q(σ′) , it cannot be that σ
′ = σ′′, nor can it be the case that
σ′, σ′′ ∈ {1, 2} because p(1)p(2) = q(1)q(2) and p(2)p(1) = q(2)q(1) . Thus it must be that either σ′ ∈ {1, 2} and
σ′′ = 3 or σ′ = 3 and σ′′ ∈ {1, 2}. Because these are symmetric, we consider the first case.
Because θ(σ, σ′)p(σ′) > 0 it must be that σ ∈ {1, 2}, but because θ(σ, σ′′)p(σ′′) > 0, it must be
that σ = 3. So no assignment of σ, σ′, σ′′ is possible.
Thus, the strictness condition is not satisfied. By simple calculations, we have θp = (0.15 0.15 0.7),
θq = (0.3 0.3 0.4). By some algebraic calculations, we have Df (p,q) = Df (θp, θq) for any function
f .
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